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Abstract
Conceptual Metaphor Theory posits that cross-domain mappings play a fundamental role in
thought. However, to date there has been little research investigating the influence of
conceptual metaphors in the subdomains of cognitive psychology, such as learning, concepts,
and memory, leading critics to argue that conceptual metaphors are not psychologically real.
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore whether conceptual metaphors influence
episodic memory. In four experiments, a modified version of the Deese-RoedigerMcDermott (DRM) paradigm was employed in which participants studied lists of
expressions. Every expression within each list was based on a proposed conceptual metaphor.
For example, the TIME IS MONEY list had expressions such as “how did you spend the
summer break?”, “budget your hours,” and “is that worth your while?”. Following each list
was a recognition test consisting of old (was on the list) and new (was not on the list) items.
Critically, some of the new items were expressions that were based on the same conceptual
metaphor as the study list (e.g., “that cost me a day”). Other new items were control
expressions that talked about a similar topic but were not based on the same metaphor (e.g.,
“the weekend seems so far away”). In all four experiments, participants were more likely to
falsely recognize new expressions that were metaphorically consistent with the study list than
control expressions. These experiments demonstrate a clear influence of conceptual
metaphors on memory, bolstering the claim that conceptual metaphors are psychologically
real. Furthermore, it was found that participants showed the memory effect despite rarely
reporting conscious awareness of the conceptual metaphors (Chapter 3). Participants also
showed the effect when their attention was divided, which is known to diminish conscious
and effortful processing (Chapters 4 and 5). Overall, these experiments provide converging
evidence that conceptual metaphors are psychologically real and influence cognition
automatically and unconsciously.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Metaphors are ubiquitous in language, and much of the everyday language we use is actually
metaphorical. For example, a phrase such as “I see your point,” when agreeing to an
argument just made, is metaphorical because there is nothing physical to see. Rather, this
expression is based on an underlying metaphor that UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, as are
other common expressions such as “look at the big picture” or “we have different views on
this issue.” Beginning around the 1980’s, linguists began to consider metaphor not just as a
special form of language, but as a fundamental component of thought, what they labeled
“conceptual metaphors.” Because abstract concepts or ideas are not experienced directly,
they are difficult to understand. Therefore, to understand these concepts we use conceptual
metaphors that draw on concrete experiences, such as by comparing thoughts to our visual
experiences.
Although linguists have made a compelling case that we use metaphors to think, the idea has
not gained as much traction in psychology. Some psychologists argue that there is little
experimental evidence that conceptual metaphors play a role in basic psychological
phenomena such as problem-solving or memory. The purpose of this dissertation was to
conduct psychological experiments to see if metaphor really does influence thought, and in
particular, memory. In a series of experiments, I presented participants with lists of
expressions that were all based on one underlying hypothesized “conceptual metaphor,” such
as UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. Following each list was a memory test in which several
old (i.e., was on the list) and new items (i.e., was not on the list) were presented and
participants had to identify the old items. Critically, some of the “new” items were based on
the same conceptual metaphor as the old items. In each experiment, I found that participants
falsely recognized these items; they thought these items had been presented before even
though they were never on the study list. This finding demonstrates that metaphors influence
how we remember information, in support of the argument that people use metaphors to
think.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) is an important theory in a wide range of
disciplines, with Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work, Metaphors we Live By (1980),
being cited in over 63,000 publications (Google Scholar, retrieved May 18, 2020).
Surprisingly, although CMT posits cognitive representations and processes, it has had
little impact in cognitive psychology. The main aim of the following studies is to provide
direct tests of some of the fundamental assumptions of CMT using the Deese/RoedigerMcDermott (DRM) paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The first goal is to test
whether conceptual metaphors are psychologically real in the sense they produce a false
memory effect, as would be expected when studied using an episodic memory test. A
secondary goal is to explore whether conceptual metaphors, if they do show memory
effects, operate automatically or require conscious and deliberate attention.

1.1

Conceptual Metaphor Theory

The theory posits that the human conceptual system is metaphorical in nature, such that
knowledge is mapped from one conceptual domain onto a second conceptual domain, via
“conceptual metaphors.” These metaphors can be inferred from examination of linguistic,
often metaphorical, expressions. Indeed, the bulk of support for the existence of
conceptual metaphors comes from text exegesis. For instance, consider the ostensibly
unrelated expressions “that cost me a day,” “budget your hours,” and “how did you spend
the summer?” Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued that these expressions are in fact not
unrelated but bear an underlying similarity, namely that each of these expressions talk
about a target domain (e.g., time: days, hours, seasons) in terms of a very specific source
domain (e.g., money: cost, budget, spend). They argued further that this particular
conceptual metaphor, TIME IS MONEY, partially structures one of the ways in which
we understand the abstract concept of “time,” and the inferences we derive about time.
Inferences would include thinking about “time” as being a valuable and limited resource
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that needs to be managed wisely or else it will be wasted. According to Lakoff and
Johnson, these inferences would not be possible without the conceptual metaphor.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose that metaphorical expressions are understood by
accessing the broader conceptual metaphor mapping upon which the expression is
supposedly based. Importantly, the theoretical claim is that, on encountering an
expression such as “how did you spend the summer?” the underlying conceptual
metaphor mapping (TIME IS MONEY) is activated automatically and arouses a set of
correspondences between the two separate mapped domains (Lakoff, 1993, 2008).
Consider an expression such as “our relationship is at a dead-end.” In this instance the
theorized set of correspondences that is assumed to be activated relates our stored
knowledge about journeys to the concept of love. When one considers a real or literal
journey, one considers the travelers, the route, the destination, the mode of transport, and
so on. When JOURNEY is mapped metaphorically onto the domain of LOVE, the
“travelers” partaking in a literal journey correspond to the lovers, the “vehicle”
corresponds to the relationship, and the “landmarks” found in a physical travel
correspond to life-events found in relationships, such as a first date, a first kiss, a
marriage, and so on (Katz & Taylor, 2008). Thus, for an expression such as “we’re at a
crossroads,” the correspondence would be that in a literal journey one must make a
decision regarding which path one must take, and if there is only one vehicle, some
travelers may have to leave the vehicle if they want to go in a different direction. When
this information is mapped onto the LOVE domain, the meaning is that the lovers need to
make a decision regarding whether they will continue together, and if one of the lovers
wants to go in a different direction, they will have to leave the relationship. According to
Lakoff (2008), correspondences such as these are automatically accessed upon
encountering a triggering expression.
As Murphy (1996) has pointed out, because CMT is a theory of conceptual knowledge,
there should be observable effects across many domains of cognition, such as memory,
problem solving, learning, and categorization. Moreover, if CMT is a psychologically
real theory then several testable hypotheses should follow from its assumptions, based on
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what is known about semantic memory and episodic memory-based research. Here I test
implications with observations from an episodic memory task. These hypotheses include,
first, if a metaphorical expression activates a conceptual metaphor, other expressions that
are also derived from the same conceptual metaphor should also become partially
activated. This follows from the spreading activation account of semantic memory, which
proposes that when one concept (e.g., “mug”) is activated, other related concepts become
partially activated as well (e.g., “cup,” “coffee,” “drink,” etc.). If a conceptual metaphor
is psychologically real, then there should be analogous processing when a triggering
metaphoric expression is encountered: other metaphoric instantiations of the conceptual
metaphor also should be partially brought to mind. Second, but also crucially,
expressions that come from a different conceptual metaphor, even if they are on a similar
topic, should not be activated, or not highly activated. That is, an expression such as “our
relationship is at a dead-end” should activate the LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual
metaphor and related expressions (e.g., “we’ve come a long way together”) but should not
activate, at least not to the same degree, the LOVE IS MAGIC conceptual metaphor and
related expressions (e.g., “she cast a spell on him,” “she’s very charming”). Although in
this example, the expressions all share the common element of LOVE, according to CMT
the expressions are derived from distinct mappings. Therefore, the spread of activation
from LOVE IS A JOURNEY expressions to LOVE IS MAGIC expressions should not be
as strong as it would be to other LOVE IS A JOURNEY expressions. If the spread of
activation was equal among all of these expressions, CMT would have little explanatory
power as a psychological theory (Katz & Reid, 2020).

1.2

Previous experimental tests of CMT.

Research that has directly tested CMT’s assumptions has provided mixed support. For
example, one might expect priming effects, a phenomenon well studied in the semantic
memory literature. Allbritton, McKoon, and Gerrig (1995) found support for CMT in a
recognition priming experiment. Participants were presented with short paragraphs in
which one of the early sentences instantiated a conceptual metaphor (e.g., CRIME IS A
VIRUS). The next several sentences either continued talking about the TARGET domain
(“congruent condition”) or shifted to talking literally about the SOURCE domain
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(“incongruent condition”). For instance, for the CRIME IS A VIRUS paragraph, the
congruent condition continued to talk about a crime outbreak and extended the metaphor
by mentioning that crime was starting to “infect” safe neighborhoods. In the incongruent
condition, the paragraph instead mentioned that the police force had literally been
infected with viral pneumonia. The final sentence, “Public officials desperately looked
for a cure,” which was the same in both conditions, therefore either referred
metaphorically to a cure for crime, further instantiating the CRIME IS A VIRUS
mapping, or referred literally to a cure for pneumonia, not instantiating the mapping
given the context. On a subsequent recognition test, participants were tested on the early
sentence that first instantiated the conceptual metaphor and on the final sentence, in that
order. Recognition times for the final sentence were faster in the congruent condition,
suggesting that recognition of the early sentence primed recognition of the final sentence
to a greater degree when both sentences instantiated the CRIME IS A VIRUS conceptual
metaphor. Similar effects were found with single word recognition (e.g., crime-CURE).
Although these results are consistent with CMT, some have argued that the findings do
not necessitate that conceptual metaphors were activated automatically as proposed by
CMT but could be explained if participants engaged in a deliberate memory strategy
(Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg, & Horton, 2000; McGlone, 2007).
Studies that focus on online sentence reading also provide mixed evidence for CMT.
These studies follow the same logic as Allbritton et al. (1995), but with online reading
measures rather than recognition latencies. Participants first read short paragraphs in
which a conceptual metaphor is instantiated by several conventional expressions. The
final sentence, on which reading time is measured, is either based on the same or a
different conceptual metaphor. Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) and Gong and Ahrens
(2007) found priming effects supportive of CMT, but Glucksberg, Brown, and McGlone
(1993) and Keysar et al. (2000) did not. Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) criticized the
stimuli employed by Keysar et al. (2000), arguing that their conventional expressions
were not really conventional and that the conditions were not properly matched in terms
of how well the lead-up sentences conceptually aligned with the target sentence.
However, Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) point out that their own effects could be
attributed to lexical priming and not necessarily the consistency of the conceptual
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metaphor mapping, a position also argued by McGlone (2011). Although this was a
potential confound, lexical priming typically has limited effects on reading natural
discourse, especially in terms of total reading time for sentences (Hyönä, 1993; Traxler,
Foss, Seely, Kaup, & Morris, 2000) which was the measure used by Thibodeau and
Durgin. Therefore, lexical priming is unlikely to have compromised their conclusions.
As one further complication, Gong and Ahrens (2007) found that the presentation format
of the sentences can also influence the results. Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) used a
paragraph presentation format whereas Glucksberg et al. (1993) and Keysar et al. (2000)
used line-by-line presentation. Gong and Ahrens argue that line-by-line presentation
leads participants to expect new information, which hinders them from using the
conceptual metaphor as a schema to process the paragraph. In a series of experiments,
they found priming effects supportive of CMT when the stimuli were presented in
paragraph form, but null effects when presented line-by-line. However, this is an ad hoc
explanation and it seems unlikely that something as inconsequential as the presentation
format could disrupt conceptual metaphor processing.
Although these studies suggest that conceptual metaphor priming is possible, it appears to
only occur under certain conditions. Furthermore, Gong and Ahrens (2007) argue that
participants’ expectations influenced the results. If this is true, it suggests that priming
depends on the participant consciously attending to the metaphorical language and
noticing how it is repeated through the discourse. If conceptual metaphor activation is
automatic, expecting new information should not matter as automatic processes are not
easily disrupted. Therefore, the fact that the form of presentation did have an influence on
reading times suggests that participants may have deliberately attended to the conceptual
metaphor mappings.
Recall that the first aim of my thesis studies is to test whether false memory effects
consistent with conceptual metaphors can be produced using the DRM paradigm. To
anticipate slightly, the answer is “yes”. A second aim of the proposed studies is to
examine whether false memory effects one could attribute to CMT are due to automatic
activation or deliberate conscious processing.
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1.3

Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT)

Steen (2009) has proposed that expressions only activate a cross-domain mapping when
they contain a “deliberate” metaphor. Steen (2008, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2017) defines a
deliberate metaphor as one that is purposely used as a metaphor in that the speaker or
writer intends the hearer or reader to see one domain in terms of another domain.
Deliberate metaphors are identified by examining the language itself. For instance,
metaphor is used deliberately if the statement or passage includes a direct comparison as
in the classic Shakespearian metaphor: “Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day.” Steen
(2008, 2009) argues that this can be considered a deliberate metaphor because the author
explicitly mentions that a comparison is taking place (“shall I compare”) and the reader
cannot help but see the individual being described in terms of an alien domain (i.e., a
summer’s day). Other indicators of deliberate metaphor use are pragmatic markers
(lexical items that signal a comparison, such as “one might say”; Gibbs, 2015; Steen,
2008), extended comparisons in which several elements of one domain are mapped onto
the other domain (Steen, 2008, 2015), novel extensions of conventional metaphors
(Steen, 2009), similes, in which the comparison is also explicitly stated (Steen, 2009),
and rejections of conventional metaphors (e.g., a therapist asking a client to think of the
harmful effects of framing cancer as a war; Steen, 2011). Researchers of deliberate
metaphor do not directly ask the speaker or writer whether they intended to use a
metaphor or not. Instead, Reijnierse, Burgers, Krennmayr, and Steen (2018) have a
procedure for identifying deliberate metaphor use in text and it is assumed that if certain
features such as those mentioned above are present, then the metaphor is being used
deliberately.
According to Steen (2009), only deliberate metaphors afford conscious metaphorical
thought, and conceptual metaphor mappings only influence cognition (at least in the ways
proposed by CMT) when the participant is consciously aware that a metaphor is being
used. As he puts it: “Contrary to what CMT assumes, the power of metaphor may not lie
in its widespread unconscious use but in its much more restricted and targeted deliberate
– sometimes conscious – use” (2009, p. 194). In other words, for conscious metaphorical
thought to occur, the metaphor must be deliberate (and even deliberate metaphors do not
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always evoke conscious metaphorical thought), and the conceptual mapping is only
engaged when the reader (or hearer) consciously realizes that it is a metaphor. If the
reader does not consciously realize a metaphor is being used, they may process the
metaphor using lexical disambiguation. For instance, for a conventional metaphor such as
“how did you spend the weekend?”, Steen argues that the hearer would simply access the
alternate meaning of spend related to “devoting time” in his or her lexicon rather than
activating a cross-domain mapping between TIME and MONEY. In this case, the
metaphorical expression should not activate other expressions based on the same
conceptual metaphor because the conceptual mapping itself is not activated.
Therefore, Steen is critical of CMT’s claim (see Lakoff, 1993) that conceptual metaphors
are engaged automatically and unconsciously. Although Steen has the most elaborated
critique of automatic conceptual metaphor activation, others have also argued that
psychological findings seemingly supportive of CMT may actually be due to participants
consciously attending to the metaphors rather than the mappings being activated
automatically and unconsciously (Glucksberg et al., 1993; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999;
Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg, & Horton, 2000; McGlone, 2007).
Although deliberateness may be an interesting variable, especially its role in
communication, the more relevant claim of that position for the current thesis is that one
needs to be consciously aware that metaphors are being used for conceptual metaphors to
influence his of her cognition. Rather than manipulate deliberateness, attention will be
manipulated here to directly assess whether cognitive effects of conceptual metaphors
depend on the participant’s conscious awareness of the metaphors being used. Indeed, if
conscious awareness is not required, then the question of whether only deliberate
metaphors evoke conscious awareness of metaphoricity may no longer be relevant, at
least regarding how conceptual metaphors affect cognition.

1.4

The current research

The research reviewed above demonstrates that results supportive of CMT can be found
using cognitive measures, such as reaction time, at least under certain conditions, though
the question of automaticity or deliberateness of these effects are to be determined. As
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noted above, CMT is a broad theory of semantic knowledge, and as such, conceptual
metaphors, if they exist, should inform all domains of cognition. The research reported in
this thesis focused on the effects of conceptual metaphors in a specific episodic memory
task, namely a variant of the Deese-Roediger/McDermott (DRM; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995) task. In this task, one finds false memory for non-presented items
related to the items on a study list. As extended to the test of CMT, I argue that analogous
effects should obtain if the study list consists of expressions that, presumably, draw on a
common conceptual metaphor. The theory then should lead to the prediction that false
memories should be observed for items not presented at study but that are also drawn
from the same conceptual metaphor.

1.4.1

Use of episodic memory to study CMT

Episodic memory involves memory for discrete events connected to a time and place in a
person’s past (Tulving, 1972). Although the participant may not be able to articulate
exactly where or when the event occurred, they remember the occurrence of the event
and its temporal-spatial relation with other events (e.g., I remember going for coffee after
seeing that movie). In contrast, semantic memory involves knowledge about the world,
such as facts and meanings of words, but one does not typically remember when and
where this knowledge was learned. A task such as the DRM, in which the participant
must indicate whether a word occurred in the experiment, is episodic because it asks
whether an event (i.e., the word) occurred at a specific place and time (i.e., during the
experiment). In contrast, a question such as “what is the capital city of Ontario?” would
involve semantic memory; that is, retrieving knowledge not connected to a discrete event
in the person’s past. Although the person would have had to learn this fact at a specific
time and place, this temporal-spatial information no longer needs to be connected to this
fact for the question to be answered. Although there is debate over how distinct the two
memory systems are (Renoult, Irish, Moscovitch, & Rugg, 2019; Tulving, 2002), it is
clear that stored knowledge of the world influences how one organizes the encoding and
retrieval of experienced episodic information, such as read verbal material (Bousfield,
1953; Tulving & Thomson, 1973, Weidemann et al., 2019).
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To my knowledge, only two studies have explicitly employed episodic memory tasks to
examine CMT (Katz & Law, 2010; Reid & Katz, 2018a). Katz and Law (2010) employed
the release from proactive interference (PI) paradigm, a task in which participants are
given consecutive short lists of items to remember and the items on all the lists are related
on some dimension (e.g., members of the same taxonomic category). Typically, a free
recall test follows each list. Many studies have found a decline in recall over lists (see
Wickens, 1970, for a review) with one of the main explanations being that the retrieval
cue (e.g., the category label) becomes overloaded, and thus, ineffective (Gardiner, Craik,
and Birtwistle, 1972; Watkins & Watkins, 1975). This effect is called the buildup of
proactive interference as previously learned items from early lists interfere with recall of
subsequent lists. A “release” from PI occurs when the items change on a dimension, for
instance, if a list contains items from a different taxonomic category from the previous
lists. When this change occurs, recall typically improves and sometimes fully recovers
from the earlier decline due to build-up of PI. Katz and Law (2010) hypothesized that a
similar build-up and release of PI would occur with metaphor expressions based on
conceptual metaphors, that is, as consecutive lists containing expressions from the same
conceptual metaphor are presented, recall would decline, but if a later list contained
expressions from a different conceptual metaphor, recall would recover. The theory
behind this was that the conceptual metaphor would act as a retrieval cue that overloads
as more exemplars are presented. When the conceptual metaphor changes, it acts as a
new, effective retrieval cue. Katz and Law’s hypothesis was confirmed. They observed
an initial decline in recall when the lists all contained expressions from the conceptual
metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, followed by an increase in recall when the final list
changed to LOVE IS MAGIC expressions. Although this supported CMT, the results are
limited because the topics of the sentences also changed, that is, the build-up and release
from PI could be due to the sentences all being about LIFE (or even JOURNEYS)
initially and changing to sentences about LOVE (or MAGIC). In other words, the effects
could be due to topical similarity, and not due to metaphorical mappings. As will be seen,
I controlled for this in the DRM paradigm by including control lures on the recognition
tests that shared either the same target or source domain as the expressions in the
presented study list but did not use the same metaphorical mapping.
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The only other published study testing CMT using an episodic memory task of which I
am aware is the DRM study by Reid and Katz (2018a). This study has been published
and, because it is the foundation for all subsequent studies in this thesis, is included here
as Chapter 2.

1.4.2

Employing the DRM procedure

The DRM procedure is a well-known episodic memory task influenced by semantic
information, and therefore, affords an explicit test of CMT. In the standard DRM
paradigm, participants are given multiple lists of words, with all items in a list associated
to one non-presented concept (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). For instance, the list might
include a number of words that are associated to “sleep”, such as bed, awake, rest, doze,
and pillow. However, the word “sleep” is not presented during the study phase. After
processing the study list, participants are asked to recall the list or to recognize the
presented items from a set that also contains “lures.” The lures consist of new items not
associated with the list at all and the critical lure, the item around which the study list was
constructed but was not presented in the study phase. Typically, participants falsely
remember the non-presented critical lure, sometimes even as often as presented words.
One of the popular theories to explain this effect is based on the postulation that when
one concept is activated in semantic memory, activation spreads to other semantically
related concepts, known as “spreading activation” theory (e.g., Roediger, Balota, &
Watson, 2001). With the DRM paradigm, each of the presented concepts partially
activates the critical non-presented concept, and if this concept receives enough
activation across all the presented words then it could induce a false memory in a later
episodic memory test. One of the explanations for false memory that goes hand in hand
with spreading activation is “processing fluency,” which refers to the ease with which
stimuli are processed (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Kelley &
Jacoby, 1998). There are two types of fluency: perceptual and conceptual. Perceptual
fluency occurs when a stimulus is more easily processed perceptually, such as if the
stimulus is flashed on the screen for a short duration in lowercase letters before being
shown in uppercase levels for the recognition judgment (e.g., mug-MUG; Jacoby &
Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram, 1993).
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Conceptual fluency involves a semantic associate (e.g., drink-MUG) being flashed on the
screen, leading to semantic, but not perceptual priming of the to-be-recognized stimulus
(Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). Conceptual fluency is thus a by-product that occurs when
associated concepts are primed through spreading activation, leading to more fluent
processing in a subsequent recognition test. Fluency in general affects recognition.
Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Kelley &
Jacoby, 1998) argue that fluency is a heuristic used to judge the familiarity of a stimulus.
This not only influences correct recognition, but also false recognition because the
participant mistakes the ease with which they process the stimulus as familiarity with it
(Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). Both conceptual (Rajaram & Geraci, 2000) and perceptual
(Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram, 1993) fluency increase false recognition.
Conceptual fluency has been proposed as a possible mechanism that causes or at least
contributes to the DRM false memory effect (Doss, Bluestone, & Gallo, 2016; Gallo &
Roediger, 2003; Whittlesea, 2002). Whittlesea found that after reading a DRM-type list
of associates, the critical lure was processed faster in a subsequent lexical decision task.
This suggests that the study list enhanced semantic processing of the lure. Therefore,
DRM study lists may parallel semantic masked priming manipulations at recognition
(Rajaram & Geraci, 2000) as both lead to conceptually fluent processing of the lure.1
This fluency may then be (mistakenly) attributed to familiarity with the item (Jacoby,
Kelley, & Dywan, 1989).2
According to CMT, when one encounters a metaphorical expression, the underlying
conceptual metaphor is automatically activated, and this activates the entire set of

1

Note that increased processing fluency does not necessarily lead to faster recognition response
latencies (Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). Unlike a lexical decision task that more
directly measures processing speed, recognition is a judgment of whether the stimulus was
previously experienced. Therefore, in a recognition task, after the stimulus has been processed the
participant must still make a memory decision. As such, multiple factors contribute to a
recognition decision and recognition latency is not a pure measure of processing speed.
2

Although the focus here is on false recognition, see Leboe and Whittlesea (2002) for how an
attribution process could underlie false recall as well.
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correspondences between the two domains. If the entire set of correspondences is indeed
activated, presumably other expressions from the same conceptual metaphor should be
processed more fluently. Therefore, like other conceptual fluency manipulations,
conceptual metaphors should induce false recognition.
The other major theory of false memory is fuzzy-trace theory, which proposes that
participants extract the meaning, or “gist” of the stimuli they are presented, and make
memory errors because non-presented items are consistent with the gist of the presented
items (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). One can in principle extend
this theory to how conceptual metaphors may induce false memories. When a participant
reads a list of expressions based on one underlying metaphor mapping, this mapping
could be considered the “gist” of the list. The conceptual metaphor itself, as well as other
non-presented expressions based on the same mapping would be consistent with the gist,
and thus, should be likely to be falsely remembered. Unlike spreading activation which
posits automatic activation, fuzzy-trace theory does not take a stance on whether gist
extraction is automatic or more intentional in nature (Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian, &
Reyna, 2006). Therefore, if false recognition occurs with conceptual metaphor
expressions, it does not necessarily prove that conceptual metaphors are activated
automatically. Nonetheless, according to both spreading activation and fuzzy-trace
theory, it is possible for conceptual metaphors to induce false memories.
The following chapters will detail four experiments in which I adapted the DRM
paradigm for testing CMT by constructing lists of expressions based on conceptual
metaphors. The hypothesis was that activation from reading the study list expressions
would spread to other non-presented expressions that are based on the same conceptual
metaphor mapping. As a result, these non-presented expressions would be more likely
falsely recognized than control expressions that do not engage the same conceptual
metaphor. Also, because each presented expression should activate the conceptual
metaphor, the conceptual metaphor label itself (e.g., “time is money”) may also be falsely
recognized.
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Chapter 2 is a published article in which we found evidence of a “conceptual metaphor
false memory effect” using a simple old/new recognition test. Chapter 3 replicates and
extends the study by assessing participants’ subjective experiences of false recognition
and their strategies for remembering the lists. Chapters 4 and 5 directly assess the
automaticity of conceptual metaphor activation by replicating the false memory effect
under divided attention conditions at both study and test. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the
findings from all four experiments and implications for memory theories, CMT, and
DMT.
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Abstract
Although Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory has been influential across
many disciplines, little research has tested the psychological reality of conceptual
metaphors (CMs) using established experimental memory paradigms. Here we employ
an episodic memory task based on the DRM false memory paradigm to explore this
possibility. We find that after reading lists of sentences based on underlying conceptual
metaphors that participants are more likely to falsely remember the non-presented
conceptual metaphors themselves as well as new sentences consistent with the CM
mapping than control items that do not share this mapping. This finding provides
experimental support for conceptual metaphors and highlights the utility of using
episodic tasks to explore the assumptions of this theory.
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2.1

Introduction

Metaphor has been considered traditionally as a matter of language and not as thought.
Thus, on encountering a metaphor such as “my life is a dead-end street”, traditional
comprehension models argue that an interpretation depends on mapping semantic
properties of the concept “life” onto properties of the concept “dead-end street” (eg.,
Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) or in categorizing “dead-end streets” into an ad hoc category,
such as “places that lead nowhere” (e.g., Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990). However, starting
with Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work, Metaphors we Live By (1980) the argument has
been made that metaphor is fundamentally a matter of thought, and not merely language.
This approach has become known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). From the
CMT perspective a sentence such as “my life is a dead-end street” is a metaphoric
expression that is motivated and understood through an underlying metaphoric
conceptual system, in which a concept (usually abstract), such as “love”, is mapped onto
a target concept such as “journey”, based on experiential and embodied interactions with
one’s environment. The LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual structure thus motivates and
structures our understanding of love through our understanding of journeys, such as they
have a beginning, an end, a route taken, possible impediments and detours, dead-ends and
the like. From this perspective seemingly unrelated metaphoric expressions can be
understood as sharing a more basic conceptual underpinning.
Consider, for example, the abstract concept of “time”. According to the CMT, our
conceptualization of “time” is structured around the notion that time is like “money” a
resource that is limited and can be depleted, implicating the conceptual mapping TIME IS
MONEY. For example, we talk about time as if it can be spent (“I’ve been spending a lot
of quality minutes with her lately”), wasted (“this project is a waste of time”), invested
(“studying psychology is a good investment of your time”), hoarded (e.g., “I have more
than enough months with which to complete that project”), and so on.
One cannot underestimate the intra-disciplinary influence of conceptual metaphor theory.
It has become a dominant approach in a large number of disciples (see for instance the
complete issue of the journal Cognitive Semiotics which not only demonstrates the range
of applications, but the modifications, limitations and the promissory notes held by the
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theory, Fusaroli & Morgagni, 2013). Indeed the seminal work, “Metaphors we live by”
has been cited almost 50, 000 times according to Google Scholar, and a later work by
Lakoff (The contemporary theory of metaphor, 1993) over 6,000 times. One reason for
the popularity of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) theory is not only its applicability to the
many disciplines based on analyzing discourse but because it is an early and important
contributor to broader theories of grounded cognition- a class of theories that argue
cognition is fundamentally tied to perception and action, and that concepts are not merely
amodal symbolic representations (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gibbs, 2006). One of the
major issues with such theories is in offering an account of how abstract concepts could
be represented in an embodied format. Conceptual metaphor theory offers a compelling
solution for this, that is, that abstract concepts are understood metaphorically via more
concrete, experiential domains.
Despite the strong adoption of CMT in many disciplines, and although Lakoff and
Johnson’s (1980) theory makes many claims about concept representation, semantic
memory, and language comprehension, the discipline in which it has failed to gain
significant traction is in the one that most directly and experimentally studies concept
representation, memory and language, namely cognitive psychology. There are several
reasons for this lack of support (see Gibbs, 2009), though most frequently mentioned are
those that revolve around claims that the theory is too underspecified for experimental
testing and that supportive findings can be more parsimoniously explained by more
accepted mechanisms, such as those based on associative mechanisms (McGlone, 2011).
The paucity of convincing experimental support stand in contrast to the bulk of a
supportive literature which is based largely on text exegesis, a methodology not favoured
in experimental cognitive psychology. Additionally, the CMT is based on a hypothetical
conceptual system that does not fit in easily with current models of online language
comprehension or semantic memory found in the experimental cognitive science
literature. Finally, the supportive evidence is often adduced from studies indicating the
embodiment of concepts, such that, for instance, showing that physical closeness is
related to ratings of similarity as suggested by a conceptual metaphor SIMILARTY IS
CLOSENESS (e.g., Casasanto, 2008) or data indicating brain activity in areas associated
with motor or sensory regions when one is processing linguistic information that
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referenced motor or spatial information (Desai, Binder, Conant, Mano, & Seidenberg,
2011). Although the findings from such studies are exciting and suggest that conceptual
metaphors are experiential and grounded in embodied mechanisms, they nonetheless are
inferential and subject to the criticism that one can show embodied cognition without
necessarily invoking the presence of conceptual metaphors (see Barsalou & WiemerHastings, 2005).
The aim of the paper presented here is to adopt a paradigm found in the experimental
literature on memory and, by adapting a logic similar to that accepted in the memory
literature, test to see if conceptual metaphors influence memory in the ways predicted by
the extant literature. Specifically, in the studies reported here we employ methodology
well-established in the memory literature in which it has been assumed that underlying
semantic structures have been activated during the encoding of verbal materials and the
results of this activation are present during a later memory test of the originally presented
materials. We also aim to test whether an alternative explanation, based on associative
similarity, could explain the effects observed.
It should be noted that there is a very limited literature that has employed memory tasks
to test CMT. Katz and Taylor (2008) examined the psychological reality of conceptual
metaphors using various semantic memory tasks. Specifically, they examined whether
the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor structured participants’ semantic memory of typical
life events. Over a set of studies, Katz and Taylor (2008) argued that their results were
suggestive of activation of the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. The
supportive data included preference for forward temporal order in producing idealized
life events of an imagined 70-year old, along with high agreement between participants
regarding the age, the affect, and whether the event actually happened. These data
suggest that knowledge of a typical life is structured as proceeding along a path with
well-known landmarks along the way.
More convincing evidence can be found in episodic memory tasks. In typical episodic
tasks participants are presented information to remember (study phase) and after a set
amount of time are asked to remember the presented information. A well-established
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memory principle is that the nature of encoding the material at study will be reflected in
subsequent memory. As applied to CMT, the notion is that if seemingly unrelated items
activate a memory structure without conscious consideration then traces of that activation
will be found in subsequent memory.
Allbritton, McKoon, and Gerrig (1995) found that recognition response times were faster
in contexts that made a critical phrase metaphorical (the schema-matching condition)
than the sentence as read literally, arguing that the underlying conceptual metaphor
supported schematically had been automatically activated during text processing and
facilitated later recognition. However these data have been criticized by McGlone (2007)
who has argued that the procedure used by Allbritton et al. did not control for the
possibility of strategic (not automatic) memory effects nor did the study control for a
more basic explanation, namely lexical priming.
Katz and Law (2010) also found evidence for CM using the release from proactive
interference (PI) procedure (Wickens, 1970). As with the typical release from PI effect
(based on short-term recall of a set of words (e.g., robin, crow, sparrow), Katz and Law
found that short phrases exemplifying the basic conceptual metaphor TIME IS AN
EXPENDABLE RESOURCE, were recalled progressively more poorly as the
instantiations of the conceptual metaphor were changed over three trials (the so-called
build up of PI). When the items were changed on the 4th trial to exemplify a different
conceptual metaphor, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, a noticeable release from PI occurred.
These data are completely consistent with the notion from CMT that the underlying
conceptual mapping is automatically engaged when reading the metaphoric expressions.
Continued exposure to the same conceptual metaphor makes that metaphor a less
effective retrieval cue over trials, whereas changing conceptual metaphors (on trial 4)
introduces a new retrieval cue for use. Although these findings clearly support CMT, one
should nonetheless treat the positive findings cautiously as the data are based basically on
only one conceptual metaphor.
In the study reported here another episodic memory task is employed, namely the DRM
false memory paradigm associated with Roediger and McDermott (1995) and originally
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used in Deese (1959). We employ this task because it permits for a novel prediction
while, at the same time affording the introduction of control conditions to discount
alternative explanations. In the standard DRM task participants are presented with study
lists of seemingly unrelated words, with each word on any one list strongly associated
with a non-presented target word. In a later memory test of the items, the non-presented
target is likely to be “falsely” remembered, that is recalled or recognized as if it had
actually been on the study list. For example, one of the study lists used by Roediger and
McDermott consisted of the following 15 words: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake,
snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, nap, peace, yawn, and drowsy. The critical nonpresented word for this list was “sleep,” which is associated with each word in the list.
Roediger and McDermott constructed several lists similar to this and they found that
participants falsely recalled the critical non-presented words at very high rates (40% and
55% for experiments 1 and 2 respectively).
There are two competing explanations for the false memory of the non-presented item.
One explanation is based on spreading activation, which is the idea that when a concept is
activated in semantic memory, other associated concepts are also partially activated (see
Cann, McRae and Katz, 2011 for a review). In the case of the study lists used by
Roediger and McDermott, each word in the list supposedly partially activates the nonpresented concept, and as a result, it becomes highly active in semantic memory. When
remembering the presented items at a later time the heightened level of activation for
presented items, plus the non-presented target due to spreading activation, relative to nonpresented items in general, is used to identify the items to be recalled or recognized.
An alternative theory for the false memory produced in the DRM paradigm follows from
“fuzzy trace” theory (see Cann et al., 2011, for a review). The basic tenet of this theory is
that on encountering the items in the study list two forms of representations are formed: a
verbatim representation based on the details of the item and a gist representation based on
the generalized (fuzzy) underlying meaning. In most cases, use of gist traces is employed
in memory and reasoning tasks. In the DRM task gist recall of non-presented items
occurs because the gist shares high overlap with the verbatim-based representations.
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Regardless of the theoretical basis for the DRM recall of word lists, the procedure,
appropriately modified, is arguably an ideal means of testing the psychological reality of
conceptual metaphors. Lakoff (2008) argues that when a person encounters a
metaphorical expression, the conceptual metaphor that underlies the expression is
automatically activated. This assumption is similar to the notion found in experimental
psychology that on encountering a word (e.g., “crow”) associative links, including
superordinate category names (e.g., “BIRD”) are activated automatically. Following that
logic, one can speculate that reading a metaphoric expression should automatically
engage a conceptual metaphor and, if a participant reads several metaphorical expressions
that, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), are all based on a common conceptual
metaphor, this conceptual metaphor should be highly activated much like the critical nonpresented words in the DRM paradigm or produce a gist representation that encompasses
the meaning of the metaphoric mapping. If CMT is correct, participants should falsely
remember a non-presented conceptual metaphor or other metaphoric expressions based
on that conceptual metaphor after reading a list of several metaphorical expressions based
on this conceptual metaphor.
In the experiment presented here, participants will read a set of lists of sentences
(metaphoric expressions) with each set consisting of items that correspond to a putative
conceptual metaphor identified by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Specifically, we argue that
after reading a set of phrases, such as “that cost me a day,” “how did you spend the
summer break?” and “budget your hours,” CMT should predict that both the conceptual
metaphor TIME IS MONEY and other non-presented instantiations of the conceptual
metaphor will be falsely remembered as having occurred during the study phase at a
significantly higher rate than found with falsely remembered control lures. Moreover, in
line with arguments that even if the predicted results obtained they could be based not on
arousal of an underlying conceptual metaphor but on associative factors, we assess also
the influence of associative factors.
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2.2
2.2.1

Method
Basic task

Participants were presented with several sets of sentences, each set associated with a
conceptual metaphor. Shortly afterwards, for each set, participants were asked to choose
the presented items from amongst a set of items, some having been presented (OLD
items), some lures associated with the conceptual metaphors (the conceptual metaphor
itself and other NEW items that were associated with the conceptual metaphor but had
not been presented originally) and some control lures. The list structures are described in
more detail below. Following the presentation and the memory testing of all the lists, a
final recognition test was conducted consisting of items and lures based on each of the
earlier presented lists.

2.2.2

Participants

Forty-eight undergraduate psychology students were recruited from Western University
for participation (24 females, mean age = 18.5 years). Participants were recruited via a
cloud based participant management system and participated as part of a partial course
requirement. This webpage is used to connect participants with researchers -- researchers
post research study advertisements and eligible participants (mostly first-year psychology
students) can view descriptions of these studies, and if they so choose, sign up for
available timeslots.

2.2.3

Materials

Five study lists were constructed based on five different well-established conceptual
metaphors identified by Lakoff and Johnson (1980): IDEAS ARE FOOD, LOVE IS A
JOURNEY, TIME IS MONEY, THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, and
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING (see Appendix B for full study lists and lures). Each
list had 15 phrases that were mostly taken or adjusted from the master metaphor list
(Lakoff, 1994). The phrases were based on the conceptual metaphors and each phrase
included one word relating to the target domain (e.g., IDEAS) and one word relating to
the source domain (e.g., FOOD). In addition, none of the phrases in the study list
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contained either of the critical words in the conceptual metaphor, for example, none of
the phrases in the IDEAS ARE FOOD list contained the words “idea” or “food.” Also, as
might be obvious, the phrases were all metaphorical, so that a concept from the target
domain was framed in terms of a concept from the source domain. Given that we were
interested in seeing whether the conceptual metaphor itself would be falsely remembered
and because these metaphors are typically written in the A IS A B form (e.g., LIFE IS A
JOURNEY) whereas metaphoric expressions are rarely found in that form, we ensured
that four of the fifteen phrases in each list used was presented in the nominal “a is a b”
(e.g., “knowledge is consumable”). If metaphoric expressions in this form were not
included in the study lists, participants could potentially use this as a strategy for
correctly rejecting the critical conceptual metaphor items on the recognition test.

2.2.3.1

Distractor task

As is common with this procedure, we included a distractor task in between each study
list and recognition test. The distractor task consisted of 10 simple math problems that
required attention to the proper order of operations to solve (e.g., 6 – 6 ÷ (7 – 5), answer
= 3). Participants were asked to complete these questions mentally without using paper or
a calculator. This distractor task was simply to prevent participants from rehearsing the
study list phrases before memory for the study list items was assessed.

2.2.3.2

Recognition tests

Following each study list and on completion of the distractor task, participants completed
a recognition test on the list they had just completed. The recognition test consisted of 12
phrases of 5 different types: 5 items presented on the study list (old items), the conceptual
metaphor (not presented at study), 2 new phrases consistent with the conceptual metaphor
(new critical phrases not presented at study), 2 new metaphor control lures, and 2 new
literal control lures. The old items were simply phrases that were presented on the
preceding list, and were drawn from serial positions 1, 3, 8, 10, and 15. The conceptual
metaphor items were those identified by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that are putatively
the underlying cross-domain connections that motivate all the phrases in the study list.
The new critical phrases were consistent with the conceptual metaphors, but were not
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presented in the lists. For example, a new critical phrase for the IDEAS ARE FOOD list
was “that claim is hard to swallow,” which also frames an idea concept (“claim”) in terms
of a food concept (“swallow”), but was not one of the phrases presented on the study list.
The control lures consisted of two types: metaphorical and literal. The metaphorical lures
were phrases that framed the same target domain, but with a different source domain.
For example, the phrase “that kind of thinking is out of style,” which Lakoff categorizes
under the IDEAS ARE FASHIONS conceptual metaphor, was one of the metaphorical
control lures for the IDEAS ARE FOOD list. These lures were added to rule out that
participants were simply encoding that the lists consisted of metaphorical phrases about a
target domain (e.g., IDEAS), and not encoding the conceptual mapping of the source
domain onto the target domain. For instance, if the participant simply encoded that all
the phrases were metaphorical expressions about ideas, and not that the expressions
specifically framed ideas in terms of food. We also included literal control lures, which
were literal phrases relating to the source domain. For example, the phrase “The dessert
was too sweet” is a literal statement about food, the source domain of the IDEAS ARE
FOOD conceptual metaphor. These items were included to rule out that participants were
simply encoding a list of sentences relating to the source domain, and not encoding the
conceptual mapping (e.g., if the participant simply encoded that all the sentences were
about food for the IDEAS ARE FOOD list). The critical point is that for evidence to
support CMT, false recognition must involve the correct source-target mapping.

2.2.4

Procedure

Upon arriving at the lab, participants were given a letter of information that explained the
requirements of the study, as well as a consent form to sign. The task was entirely
computer based. The first two screens asked for demographic information (i.e., gender
and age) and then the next three screens were instructions for the task. The participants
were told that the researchers were interested in the relationship between mental math
ability and memory for sentences. The purpose of this deception was so that the
participants would take the distractor maths tasks seriously. The participants were also
told that they would see several lists of phrases and after each list, they would have to
identify items as old if it had been on the list, or new if it had not been on the list.
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Following the instructions was a practice list of items to get the participants used to the
task. The items on the practice list were literal phrases taken from Cardillo, Schmidt,
Kranjec, and Chatterjee’s (2010) matched literal and metaphor stimuli. Each phrase was
presented in the centre of the screen for 3 seconds, followed by a fixation cross presented
for 500 ms. The practice list was followed by the maths distractor task, which consisted
of 10 short math problems. Participants were instructed to answer the questions as
quickly and as accurately as possible; however, the program gave them an unlimited
amount of time to answer each question. For the 10 practice math questions, participants
were given feedback on what the correct answers were, but feedback was not given for
subsequent trials. Following the maths test, participants completed the recognition task,
in which several phrases were presented on the screen, and participants had the option of
either identifying them as old by pressing the “o” key, or as new by pressing the “n” key.
Similar to the math distractors, participants did not have a time constraint on the
recognition test. For the practice recognition test only, participants were given feedback
on whether they correctly identified each item as old or new. The five study lists
followed the practice list, but the format remained the same, that is, they saw the study
list, answered the maths distractors, and then completed a recognition test for the study
list they had just read. Each of these three phases was presented in the same way as the
practice trial, except that no feedback was given for the math distractors or the
recognition tests. Following the presentation of all of the lists, there was one more math
distractor consisting of 10 questions, and then there was a large recognition test at the end
that tested memory for all 5 lists. The same 60 items that were already tested in the
previous recognition tests were retested. In addition, 14 old items (taken from serial
positions 5, 7, and 13 from each study list; however, due to an experiment error, only 2
additional old items from the TIME IS MONEY list were added from serial positions 5
and 13), 5 new consistent phrases, 5 new metaphor control lures, and 10 new literal
control lures were added to this recognition test. The new lures corresponded with the
five presented lists, that is, there was 1 new consistent phrase, 1 new metaphor control,
and 2 new literal controls added for each study list. We could not add new conceptual
metaphor lures because there is only one conceptual metaphor for each study list. The
final test was to examine the longevity of the activation of the conceptual metaphor.
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Following the final recognition task, participants were debriefed and thanked for their
participation. The entire task took approximately 30 minutes to complete.

2.3
2.3.1

Results and discussion
Initial recognition tests

Participants completed a recognition test following each of the five study lists. One male
participant identified all items as “old” and was removed from further analyses, yielding
a final sample of 47 participants. The data presented below is based on performance
across all study lists. That is, scores could go from 0-5 for false recognition of the
conceptual metaphor, given there was only one opportunity to falsely remember that item
on each of the five lists. Participants were quite accurate at correctly identifying
presented items as old, the mean proportion of old items correctly categorized as old was
.823. Of critical interest were the proportions of falsely recognized items for the four lure
types. We conducted a one-way ANOVA on these proportions. Mauchly’s test of
sphericity revealed that the assumption of sphericity was violated χ²(5) = 34.550, p <
.001, thus, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser
correction. The mean proportion of falsely recognized items between the lure types
differed significantly, F(2.232, 102.675) = 8.799, p < .001, η² = .161. The mean
proportion (and standard deviations) of items identified as old for each item type are
displayed in Table 2.1.

3

Due to an experiment error, two of the old items on the recognition tests varied slightly from
how they were presented on the study lists. For example, on the study list one of these items was
“We’ve come a long way as a couple,” but on the recognition test it was “They’ve come a long
way as a couple.” We removed these items from further analyses yielding a final count of 23 old
items.
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Table 2.1. Mean proportion (and standard deviation) of items categorized as “old” across
participants for each of the five item types. Means are collapsed across the five initial
recognition tests.
Lure type
Number of items in
Mean (and SD) proportion of items
category
categorized as old
Old
23*
.8224 (.1080)
Critical CM
5
.1745 (.1939)
Critical consistent
10
.2021 (.1824)
Control metaphor
10
.1000 (.1216)
Control literal
10
.0979 (.1440)
Total
58
.4101 (.0854)
*NOTE: As mentioned above, two old items were removed from analysis due to slight
differences between study and test phases.
As can be seen, there was considerably higher proportional false memories produced for
the conceptual metaphors and the new items from that for the two control lures.
We conducted four planned comparisons: critical CM’s vs. metaphor controls, critical
CM’s vs. literal controls, critical consistent vs. metaphor controls, and critical consistent
vs. literal controls. As predicted, all four comparisons were significant and in the
hypothesized direction (all p’s < 0.02).
Specifically, Least Significant Difference (LSD) post-hoc comparisons revealed that the
false recognition rates did not differ significantly between the critical CM’s and critical
consistent phrases (p = .383) or between the control metaphor lures and the control literal
lures (p = .875). However, there were significant differences between false recognition
of the conceptual metaphor and control metaphor lures (p=.013, Cohen’s d = .460) and
control literal lures (p=.006, Cohen’s d = .449). Similarly more false recognitions
occurred for non-presented metaphor expressions that were consistent with the
conceptual metaphor that both the control metaphor lures (p< .001, Cohen’s d= .659) and
control literal lures (p< .001, Cohen’s d= .635).

2.3.2

Latent Semantic Analysis on lures

Recall that an expressed concern regarding CMT is that supportive results could be
explained without recourse to postulating a conceptual system of cross-domain mappings.
With respect to the DRM procedure in standard episodic word list studies the
predominate theory postulates false memories obtain because of the high level of
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associative arousal. As applied to the results presented here an associative explanation
could be that the critical lures (the conceptual metaphors and the new expressions that
instantiate the conceptual metaphor) were falsely recognized more often than the control
lures because they are semantically more related to their associated study lists. To rule
this out, Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) was used to compute the semantic distance
between each lure and the sentences on its study list; LSA generates values of semantic
distance between words, sentences, or texts based on the co-occurrence of words in text
corpora (Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998). We computed these values using the
sentence comparison application on the University of Colorado’s LSA website
(lsa.colorado.edu) based on the most appropriate grade level, namely “General Reading
up to 1st year college” setting. This application, which computes semantic distance based
on whole sentences, provided us with an LSA value indicating the semantic distance
between each lure and each sentence in its respective study list (15 values in total) with
higher values indicating that the sentences are closer in semantic space. We took the
average of these 15 values to provide a single value for the lure that represented the
semantic distance between the lure and its study list, and we did this for each of the 35
lures. The average semantic distances (and SD’s) for the four lure types were as follows:
critical CM = .122 (.043), critical consistent = .097 (.059), metaphor control = .081
(.080), and literal control = .094 (.058). A between-item ANOVA demonstrated that the
lure types did not vary significantly in terms of average semantic distance from their
respective lists, F(3, 31) = .462, p = .711.
Additional analysis demonstrated that there was not a significant correlation overall
between semantic distance values and false recognition rates for the items, r(33) = .168, p
= .335. Thus, we find no evidence that an associative explanation based on distance in
semantic memory can account for the data we observed.

2.3.3

Final recognition test

Recall that participants also completed a large recognition test at the end of the study that
consisted of old items and lures from all of the study lists. This recognition test consisted
of the 60 items from the previous recognition tests, as well as 34 items that had not been
tested yet: 14 additional old items, 5 new critical consistent lures, 5 new metaphor control
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lures, and 10 new literal control lures. Participants were instructed to categorize the item
as “old” only if they had remembered seeing it on one of the study lists.
Participants were slightly less accurate in correctly identifying presented items as old on
this final recognition test. The proportion of correctly categorized old items was .77 for
items previously tested and .56 for items not previously tested. The lower accuracy for
previously untested items is likely due to the greater amount of time between test and
recall in which the memory traces decayed.
It was not possible to conduct a factorial ANOVA examining the effect of introducing
new items because the critical conceptual metaphors had been presented as items in the
original recognition tests. Because each list derives from a single conceptual metaphor, it
was not possible to add new conceptual metaphors to the final recognition test, which
created a missing cell in the matrix. Thus, we conducted a one-way ANOVA with seven
lure types: repeated critical CM, repeated critical consistent, repeated metaphor control,
repeated literal control, non-repeated critical consistent, non-repeated metaphor control,
and non-repeated literal control. Mauchly’s test of sphericity revealed that the
assumption of sphericity was violated χ²(20) = 68.423, p < .001, thus, the degrees of
freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. The F-test revealed that
the proportion of falsely recognized items varied significantly between lure types,
F(3.873, 178.150) = 40.554, p < .001, η² = .469. The mean number and proportion (and
standard deviations) of falsely recognized items for each lure type are displayed in Table
2.2. The upper panel represent items that had been employed in the original list and were
repeated in the second list, whereas the lower panel represents items introduced just in
the final test.
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Table 2.2. Mean proportion (and SD’s) of items categorized as old for each item type
across participants in the final recognition task.
Repeated
Item type
Number of items
Proportion categorized as old
Yes
Old
23*
.7715 (.1452)
Critical CM
5
.3957 (.2843)
Critical consistent
10
.4681 (.1990)
Metaphor control
10
.3362 (.23165)
Literal control
10
.2106 (.2159)
Total Repeated
58
.5150 (.1223)
No
Old
14**
.5593 (.1647)
Critical consistent
5
.2298 (.2206)
Metaphor control
5
.0766 (.1355)
Literal control
10
.0362 (.0705)
Total Non-repeated
34
.2860 (.0901)
*As mentioned above, two old items were removed from analysis due to slight
differences between study and test phases.
**Due to an experiment error, only two non-repeated old items from the TIME IS
MONEY list were included. Three non-repeated old items were included from the other
four lists yielding a total of 14 non-repeated old items.
As is evident, items that had been previously tested showed a large increase (over 20% on
average for each lure type) in false recognition on this final test. Posthoc comparisons
with Bonferroni corrections were conducted on the seven categories of lures and are
presented in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3. Posthoc comparisons with Bonferroni corrections between the seven
categories of lures for the final recognition test.
Comparison
Mean Difference p-value
Rep. Crit. CM
– Rep. Crit. consistent
-.072
> .999
– Rep. Cont. metaphor
.060
> .999
– Rep. Cont. literal
.185**
.004
– Non-Rep. Crit. consistent
.166*
.032
– Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor
.319***
< .001
– Non-Rep. Cont. literal
.360***
< .001
Rep. Crit. consistent
– Rep. Cont. metaphor
.132*
.035
– Rep. Cont. literal
.257***
< .001
– Non-Rep. Crit. consistent
.238***
< .001
– Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor
.391***
< .001
– Non-Rep. Cont. literal
.432***
< .001
Rep. Cont. metaphor
– Rep. Cont. literal
.126***
< .001
– Non-Rep. Crit. consistent
.106*
.030
– Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor
.260***
< .001
– Non-Rep. Cont. literal
.300***
< .001
Rep. Cont. literal
– Non-Rep. Crit. consistent
-.019
> .999
– Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor
.134***
< .001
– Non-Rep. Cont. literal
.174***
< .001
Non-Rep. Crit. consistent – Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor
.153**
.001
– Non-Rep. Cont. literal
.194***
< .001
Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor – Non-Rep. Cont. literal
.040
.698
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
For the sake of simplicity, we will only focus on the comparisons relevant to the test of
CMT. Importantly, the critical CM lures were falsely recognized at a significantly higher
rate than literal controls that were repeated and all three of the non-repeated lure types.
Additionally, the repeated critical consistent phrases were falsely recognized more
frequently than all the other lure types (repeated and non-repeated) except for the critical
conceptual metaphor lures. Also, the non-repeated critical consistent lures were falsely
recognized significantly more frequently than both the non-repeated literal and metaphor
controls. As with the initial recognition tests, these results support CMT as the phases
consistent with the underlying conceptual mappings were falsely remembered more often
than control lures.
There was one deviation from the original recognition test -- the false recognition rate for
the critical CM lures (M = .3957, SD = .2843) did not differ significantly from the
metaphor control lures that had been previously tested (M = .3362, SD = .2316), p > .999.
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Recall the metaphor control lures consisted of metaphoric expressions with the same
topic as the target conceptual metaphor but a different source mapping. It is not
completely clear why this occurred. It may be that while the target knowledge is
maintained over a longer retention period the specific mapping might be more susceptible
to interference. However, this explanation could not explain the higher levels of false
memories produced to new items consistent with the target conceptual metaphor
compared to those produced to the metaphor controls. A more likely explanation is that
the form of conceptual metaphor (A is a B) is used as a cue to reject the item as old, at
least relative to items sharing the same topic.

2.3.4

LSA analysis on final recognition test lures

As with the initial recognition test, semantic distance of each lure to their respective
study lists was computed for the final recognition test, using the same procedure as
employed earlier. A one-way between-item ANOVA on the seven lure types revealed
that they did not differ significantly on semantic distance to their respective lists, F(6, 48)
= 1.526, p = .190. Thus, once again, the recognition memory data is not explicable by
recourse to an associative explanation.
In summary, both the initial and the final recognition tests produced findings consistent
with our interpretation of how CMT would be expressed in an episodic memory task. We
had postulated that when one encounters a metaphorical expression (e.g., “budget your
hours”), the root conceptual metaphor (TIME IS MONEY) is automatically activated,
and that multiple encounters of different metaphoric expression instantiations would
promote false memories both of the conceptual metaphor itself and novel instantiations.
Importantly we introduced control lures in the memory tests. When the lures shared the
same target domain as the conceptual metaphor but used another source domain, they
were not falsely recognized as often as the critical lures. This rules out that participants
were simply encoding metaphorical language about the target domain. Also, when the
lures were simply literal statements about the source domain used in the conceptual
metaphor (e.g., for the TIME IS MONEY list, literal statements about money), they were
also not falsely recognized as often as the critical lures. This rules out that participants
were simply encoding that the sentences all involved the source domain. Thus, the
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results suggest that both the target and source domains were encoded, even though these
domains were never explicitly mentioned. Moreover, we conducted statistical analyses
of semantic distance of the instances to the items on the study list, finding no such
differences ruling out an explanation for the effects based on associative links.
We should mention one possibility that did not directly follow from CMT. Studies using
artificial categories have shown that one can create a set of instances based on an
underlying pattern, or prototype. Memory studies with these stimuli have shown that the
non-presented prototype is more resistant to forgetting than learned instantiations of the
prototype (Posner & Keele, 1970). If the conceptual metaphor acted similarly to a
prototype then one might have expected even more false memories in the final
recognition task, especially relative to the other categories of lures. However, on the
final recognition test, the conceptual metaphor lures were not falsely recognized
significantly more often than either the repeated critical consistent lures, or even the
repeated metaphor control lures. Although the prototype studies and our task differ
considerably from one another and the “A is a B” format of the conceptual metaphor
differs considerably from the metaphoric expressions used with the majority of items in
our task (and hence can be employed as a cue for rejecting the items) the more general
question of the longevity with which a conceptual metaphor is aroused in episodic
memory remains, and is a question for future research.
In summary, employing a standard episodic memory task and adopting assumptions used
in the cognitive psychology literature, the data presented here provides evidence for the
activation of conceptual metaphors.
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Chapter 3
Subjective experience of the conceptual metaphor false
memory effect

3

3.1

Introduction

In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated that conceptual metaphors affect episodic memory, but
the study provided little insight into the nature of the false memories. For instance, it
remains unclear whether participants used some type of guessing strategy to identify
items as old, or whether the conceptual metaphors induced compelling false memories
that felt real to the participants. The purpose of the study presented in Chapter 3 was first,
to replicate the conceptual metaphor false memory effect with additional control
conditions, and second, to gain further insight into the nature of this effect. The latter was
accomplished by two additions. First, for items identified as old, participants were asked
whether they “remember,” “know,” or “guess” the item is old (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving,
1985). Second, for half of the participants, after each list they were asked to elaborate on
any strategies they used to remember the items. This was added as an indirect measure of
whether participants were processing the metaphors in the lists consciously, with the
logic being that if they could easily report the source-to-target metaphor mappings, they
were consciously aware of the conceptual metaphors. Conversely, if participants rarely
reported attending to the source-to-target mapping, but there was still evidence of a
conceptual metaphor false memory effect, it would suggest that the conceptual metaphors
activated automatically, without requiring conscious awareness.

3.1.1

The remember-know paradigm

The remember-know procedure has been used extensively in recognition memory
research generally including in DRM-type tasks (Gallo, 2006). “Remember” and “know”
judgments are thought to index recollection and familiarity respectively, two distinct
memory processes (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review). Recollection is when one can
bring to mind details of the occurrence of an event. For a typical lab experiment, this
could involve remembering what the stimulus looked like on the screen, which serial
position the item was in the study list, or recalling a thought that came to mind when first
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seeing the item. Recollection is considered a slower process that involves intentional and
conscious processes. In contrast, familiarity is when an item is confidently recognized,
but the participant cannot bring to mind details of the event of experiencing the item. In
contrast to recollection, familiarity is thought to be fast and automatic. Guess responses
are thought to capture a weaker feeling of familiarity where the participant is not as
confident in their decision (Hirshman, 1998; Yonelinas, 2002).
Remember, know, and guess judgments were employed in the current study and
subsequent studies for two reasons. First, because the conceptual metaphor false memory
effect is a memory phenomenon, it is important to place it in context with findings from
other memory experiments, especially those on false recognition. In general, correct
recognitions tend to evoke more remembering and false recognitions more knowing
(Yonelinas, 2002; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). However, in DRM tasks in which the study
list items converge on a non-presented associate, participants often report “remembering”
this lure. In fact, “remembering” reports are often more frequent than “knowing” reports
for critical lures (Gallo, 2006; Yonelinas 2002), although the ratio of remembering to
knowing is still higher for correct recognition relative to false recognition. Therefore,
including remember, know, and guess judgments will provide insight into how the
conceptual metaphor false memory effect relates to other false recognition effects.
Second, remember, know, and guess judgments may inform the debate on CMT and
DMT, albeit indirectly. Neither theory makes explicit predictions on recollection and
familiarity; however, DMT posits that cross-domain mappings depend on conscious
awareness of metaphoricity. As such, one may expect that false recognition based on
metaphor mappings would evoke more feelings of “remembering” as this is associated
with conscious and intentional uses of memory. In contrast, CMT’s position that crossdomain mappings are activated automatically and unconsciously should be associated
with more “knowing” and “guessing” reports of false recognition. These responses
capture feelings of familiarity, which is the faster, more automatic, and unconscious
memory process. Furthermore, if conceptual metaphor activation leads to fluent
processing of metaphorically consistent expressions, there should also be a larger
magnitude of familiarity-based false recognitions as fluency is a heuristic for judging
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familiarity (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Kelley & Jacoby,
1998). Consistent with this, fluency manipulations have been found to selectively
influence “know” judgments (Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). As such, a high
percentage of false recognitions attributed to “knowing” or “guessing” would suggest that
conceptual metaphors are activated automatically and promote fluent processing of new
expressions that use the same mappings. Note though that this is only indirect evidence
and cannot carry an argument for distinguishing between CMT and DMT on its own.
Nonetheless, in conjunction with the strategy descriptions, the remember, know, and
guess judgments may provide some additional insight into the CMT-DMT debate.

3.1.2

The current study

The study lists were the same as in Chapter 2. Remember-know-guess judgments were
added and half of the participants were instructed to elaborate on any strategies they used
to remember the items after each recognition test. Also, rather than presenting all five
study lists, only four of the five study lists were presented for each participant, and the
lures associated with the non-presented study list were used as “unrelated lures” on the
recognition tests. For example, this involved examining the four lure types from the
TIME IS MONEY recognition test (e.g., the critical CM itself: “time is money”; critical
consistent: “lend me a few minutes”; etc.), but when they are presented on the recognition
test following another study list, such as IDEAS ARE FOOD. Presumably, false
recognition should be much lower under these circumstances, and critically, there should
be no differences in false recognition between the critical and control lures when they are
all unrelated to the study list. If, for example, the critical consistent lures had a higher
proportion of false recognition than the other lure types when all the lures were unrelated
to the study list, it would suggest that Reid and Katz's (2018a) results were due to
differences in the lures’ ability to evoke false recognition on there own and not due to
these lures being consistent with the activated conceptual metaphor.
The current study also improved the design of the final recognition test by including a
category of previously untested critical CM lures (i.e., the label for the conceptual
metaphor itself, such as “time is money”). These lures supposedly capture the broad,
underlying cross-domain mapping and may therefore be analogous to a prototype for the
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set of items (see Posner & Keele, 1970). Therefore, the memory traces for these lures
may be more resistant to decay compared to the other lure types. This was not found in
Reid and Katz (2018a); however, the final recognition test did not include any previously
untested critical CM lures. Untested lures are the most informative as they would not
have been seen until the final recognition test, and therefore, could not be contaminated
from being tested previously. As such, that modification will be incorporated here.

3.2
3.2.1

Method
Participants

A total of 74 (55 female) native-English speaking participants from ages 17 to 41 (Mage
= 18.53, SDage = 3.39) completed the study. Participants were psychology students at
Western University who completed the study as a partial course requirement. Participants
were recruited through the Psychology Department’s Sona system website.

3.2.2
3.2.2.1

Materials
Study lists

The five study lists employed in Chapter 2 were used in the current study. Each
participant saw only four of these five lists, yielding five different versions of the
experiment based on which of the five lists was not presented. Participants were
randomly assigned to the different versions. The number of participants assigned to each
version are displayed in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1. Number of participants assigned to the different versions of the experiment.
The different versions are based on the study list that was not presented. For instance, in
the IDEAS ARE FOOD version, the IDEAS ARE FOOD study list was not presented.
The lures associated with the non-presented list were used as unrelated lures on the
recognition tests for the other four study lists.
Condition
Version (non-presented study list)
Strategy
No Strategy
Total
IDEAS ARE FOOD
8
7
15
LOVE IS A JOURNEY
6
7
13
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS
7
8
15
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING
9*
7
16
TIME IS MONEY
7
8
15
Total
37
37
74
*Note: Due to an error by the experimenter, this version had one extra participant who
should have been assigned to the LOVE IS A JOURNEY version.

3.2.2.2

Distractor task

The maths distractor task was the same as employed in Chapter 2.

3.2.2.3

Initial recognition tests

Each recognition test consisted of eight “old” (previously presented) items and eight or
nine lures. The old items were taken from serial positions 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 15 of
the study list. Four types of “related” lures were employed (identical to Chapter 2) in
addition to a new category of “unrelated” lures, which did not share either the target or
source domain with the study list.4 The lures associated with the recognition test of the
unseen study list were used as unrelated lures on the four seen study lists. For example, if
IDEAS ARE FOOD was the study list that was not presented to participants, the seven
lures (one critical CM, two critical consistent, two control metaphor, and two control
literal lures) that would be on this recognition test were spread across the recognition
tests for the four study lists. Note that this led to an unequal division, therefore, three of
the four recognition tests had two unrelated lures whereas one recognition test only had
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Note: For simplicity, in the results I refer to the “unrelated” lures as control lures as well, along
with the two “related” control lures (control metaphor and control literal). All three of these types
can be considered controls because the prediction is that the critical lures should be falsely
recognized more often than all three.
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one unrelated lure. Which recognition test contained only the single unrelated lure was
counterbalanced across versions, such that for one version the TIME IS MONEY
recognition test contained only one unrelated lure, for one version the LOVE IS A
JOURNEY recognition test contained only one unrelated lure, etc.
Also, to explore whether conceptual metaphor activation continued to the final
recognition test, two of the four initial recognition tests did not include the critical CM
lure. This was done to allow for observations of both previously tested and untested
critical CM lures on the final recognition test. Overall, each recognition test included 0 or
1 critical CM lures, 2 critical consistent lures, 2 control metaphor lures, 2 control literal
lures, and 1 or 2 unrelated lures. An example of the four recognition tests for one version
(non-presented study list: IDEAS ARE FOOD) of the experiment is presented in Table
3.2 below.
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Table 3.2. Breakdown of items on the four recognition tests for one version of the
experiment. IDEAS ARE FOOD was the study list not presented for this version.
Study list
Item type
N
TIME IS MONEY
Old items
8
Crit CM
0
Crit consistent
2
Cont metaphor
2
Cont literal
2
Unrelated
2
Total items
16
Total lures
8
LOVE IS A JOURNEY
Old items
8
Crit CM
1
Crit consistent
2
Cont metaphor
2
Cont literal
2
Unrelated
1
Total items
16
Total lures
8
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING
Old items
8
Crit CM
1
Crit consistent
2
Cont metaphor
2
Cont literal
2
Unrelated
2
Total items
17
Total lures
9
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS
Old items
8
Crit CM
0
Crit consistent
2
Cont metaphor
2
Cont literal
2
Unrelated
2
Total items
16
Total lures
8

3.2.2.4

Final recognition test

The final recognition test included both tested and untested old items, as well as tested
and untested lures for each of the five lure types. All previously tested items were
retested on this final recognition test. Additionally, 20 untested old items (5 from each
study list; serial positions 2, 5, 7, 13, and 14), 2 untested critical CM lures, 4 untested
critical consistent lures (1 for each study list), 4 untested control metaphor lures (1 for
each study list), 8 untested control literal lures (2 for each study list), and 4 untested
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unrelated lures were included on the final recognition test. Thus, a total of 107 items were
included on the final recognition test. A breakdown of the items is displayed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3. Breakdown of items on final recognition test.
Previously tested
Item type
Yes
Old items
Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total previously tested
No
Old items
Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total not previously tested

3.2.3

N
32
2
8
8
8
7
65
20
2
4
4
8
4
42

Procedure

Testing was done on Intel (processor: intel core 2 quad; screen resolution: 1440 x 900)
and Asus (processor: intel core i5-7500; screen resolution: 1440 x 900) desktop
computers using the E-Prime 2.0 software package. Most of the procedure was similar to
Chapter 2, so I will only detail the main alterations. Along with the main task
instructions, a screen was added that explained what is meant by “remember,” “know,”
and “guess” and what type of memory would fall under each category (adjusted from
Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998, see Appendix C). On the recognition
tests, participants first made an old/new judgment, and if the item was identified as old,
they were asked to indicate whether the item was remembered, known, or guessed (if the
item was identified as new, the program simply skipped to the next item). There was no
time limit for either the old/new judgments or the remember/know/guess judgments. The
final recognition test followed the same procedure.
Half of the participants were asked to explain any strategies they used to remember the
list. Following the recognition test for each study list, a prompt appeared on the screen
that asked them to elaborate on any strategy they used, such as noticing a theme, paying
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attention to certain words, or repeating the items mentally (see appendix D for full
instructions). The prompt also indicated that there were no right or wrong answers, and if
the participant did not use a strategy, they could simple type in “I did not use any
conscious strategy.” Underneath the prompt was a textbox that allowed for an openresponse and there was no time limit. Only half of the participants were asked to
elaborate on strategies because we did not know if consciously thinking about strategies
would influence how participants performed. Therefore, for comparison the other half of
participants were not asked about strategies. Participants were randomly assigned to the
“strategy” and “no-strategy” conditions. The “strategy” group was only prompted after
the initial recognition tests, and therefore, the final recognition test was identical for both
groups.

3.3
3.3.1
3.3.1.1

Results
Initial recognition tests
Preliminary analysis

I examined whether the critical CM, critical consistent, control literal, and control
metaphor lures differed in false recognition when they were presented on unrelated study
lists (e.g., examining a lure such as “that cost me a day,” which is associated with the
TIME IS MONEY list, but when tested following another list such as IDEAS ARE
FOOD).
Overall, the proportion of false recognition was infrequent when the lures were not
related to the study list (critical CM: .07 critical consistent: .07, control metaphor: .08,
control literal: .02; average of the four types: .05. See Appendix E for full breakdown of
remember, know, and guess judgments). A 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted with condition
(strategy vs. no-strategy) as a between-subjects factor and lure type as a within-subjects
factor. Critically, there was no significant main effect of lure type, F(2.44, 175.42)5 =

5

The assumption of sphericity was violated, therefore, the degrees of freedom were adjusted
using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.
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1.59, p = .201. There was also no significant main effect of condition, F(1, 72) = 0.485, p
= .488, nor was the interaction between condition and lure type reliable, F(2.44, 175.42)
= 2.54, p = .070. These findings confirm that the four lure types did not differ
significantly in terms of baseline false recognition, and therefore, if the critical lures are
falsely recognized more often in the following analyses, it is attributable to conceptual
metaphor activation and not to differences in how likely the lures themselves are able to
elicit false recognitions.

3.3.1.2

Main analysis

The main analysis is whether critical lures that further instantiate the conceptual
metaphors used in the study lists (critical CM and critical consistent) are falsely
recognized more often than control lures that do not instantiate the conceptual metaphor
(control metaphor, control literal, unrelated). The proportions (and SD’s) of items
identified as old, as well as the proportions (and SD’s) of remember, know, and guess
judgments for the presented items and the five lure types are displayed in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4. Proportion (and SD) of items identified as old, as well as proportion (and SD)
of items remembered, known, and guessed for initial recognition tests of Chapter 3. Note:
data are collapsed across condition, as there were no significant main effects nor
interactions with condition.
Item type
Old
Remember Know
Guess
Old
.86(.09)
.49(.23)
.29(.23)
.08(.08)
Crit CM
.14(.26)
.04(.14)
.05(.16)
.05(.15)
Crit consistent
.28(.22)
.08(.11)
.07(.13)
.13(.16)
Cont metaphor
.12(.16)
.04(.09)
.03(.06)
.05(.10)
Cont literal
.15(.16)
.03(.07)
.04(.07)
.08(.11)
Unrelated
.06(.10)
.02(.05)
.01(.04)
.03(.07)
Total false recognition
.15(.13)
.04(.06)
.04(.06)
.07(.07)
Note: Remember, know, and guess proportions are across all items tested, including
items identified as new. For percentages within items identified as old, see Table 3.5.
A 2 x 5 ANOVA was conducted with lure type as a within-subjects factor and condition
(strategy vs. no-strategy) as a between-subjects factor. The dependent variable was the
proportion of false recognition. There was a main effect of lure type, F(2.96, 213.29) =
21.87, p < .001, η²ₚ = .233, but no main effect of condition, F(1, 72) = 0.05, p = .825, nor
an interaction between lure type and condition, F(2.96, 213.29) = 1.18, p = .316. Planned

45

comparison t-tests (collapsed across condition) were conducted to compare the two
critical lures (critical CM and critical consistent) to each of the three control lures
(control metaphor, control literal, and unrelated). The alpha level was adjusted by
dividing by two for these two sets of comparisons, resulting in an alpha of .025.6 This
alpha level will be used in all subsequent analyses of critical lures vs. control lures,
including in the following chapters. The critical consistent lures were falsely recognized
more often than all three control lures, all t(73)’s > 4.8, p’s < .001, replicating Reid and
Katz (2018a). In contrast, the critical CM lures were falsely recognized more often than
the unrelated lures, t(73) = 3.00, p = .004, but did not differ significantly from either the
control metaphor or control literal lures, both t(73)’s < 0.8, p’s > .4.

3.3.1.3

Phenomenological experience of false recognition

The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions of
presented items (actual old items) and false recognitions of lures are displayed in Table
3.5.
Table 3.5. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within
correct or false recognitions. Percentages are presented by item type.
Item type
%R
%K
%G
Old (actual presented)
57%
34%
9%
Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition

29%
28%
32%
22%
33%
28%

38%
26%
23%
23%
20%
25%

33%
47%
45%
55%
47%
48%

A 3 (remember, know, or guess) by 5 (lure type) chi-square test was conducted to
examine the percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within the falsely

6

For the effect to be attributed to conceptual metaphor activation the critical lure would need to
be falsely recognized significantly more often than all three control lures. Therefore, the error rate
is not increased by these multiple comparisons, as all three need to reach significance for the
effect to be valid. For this reason, alpha was only adjusted by dividing by two for the two critical
lures.
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recognized lures. The chi-square test revealed that the R/K/G percentages did not vary
significantly by lure type, ꭓ²(8) = 6.15, p = .631. Therefore, although conceptual
metaphor activation increased false recognitions for critical consistent lures, those lures
did not differ reliably from the other lures with respect to the phenomenological
experience of “remembering” them.
A 2 (correct vs. false recognition) x 3 (remember, know, or guess) chi-square test was
also conducted to examine the phenomenological experience of correct recognition for
actually presented items vs. false recognition for lures (regardless of lure type). The chisquare test was significant, ꭓ²(2) = 364.80, p < .001. Posthoc tests with Bonferroni
corrections (alpha = .008) revealed that all cells deviated significantly from expected
values, all z’s > 3.3, p’s < .001, indicating that false recognitions were attributed
significantly more as guess responses and significantly less as remember and know
responses than correct recognitions.

3.3.1.4

Participant strategies

There was a total of 148 strategy descriptions. Responses were categorized by two
independent raters into four types depending on whether the participant reported
attending to 1) just the target domain, 2) just the source domain, 3) both domains, or 4)
neither domain. In their initial categorizations, the raters agreed on 88% (130 of 148) of
the responses indicating high consistency. The categories of the remaining 12% (18 of
148) were decided after discussion between the two raters.
Examples of responses for each of the four categories are displayed in Table 3.6. Note
that participants did not need to report the exact words used in the conceptual metaphor
(e.g., LOVE or JOURNEY), but if they reported a theme closely related to one of the
domains (e.g., “relationships”), it was categorized as attending to that domain.
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Table 3.6. Examples of the four strategy types. Typos are left in. Note: not all examples
were the participant’s full response, but I include the relevant section for making the
classification.
Strategy type
Study list
Examples
Neither domain TIME IS
“I tried to relate the sentences as I was reading
MONEY
them to my own life. If I link the sentences to
something that I am experiencing/have
experienced they should stick with me better
than simply reading them.”

Target domain

Source domain

Both domains

IDEAS ARE
FOOD

“I repeated the sentences over and over
mentally infrequently. I also looked for specific
words that I thought were memorable. For
example, spoon-feed, learning, eating, and
raw.”*

TIME IS
MONEY

“I noticed that many of the sentences had the
common theme of time (i.e. they references
hours, minutes days etc)”

LOVE IS A
JOURNEY

“I looked for a theme and found on in this
particular list, which was about love, dating, and
relationships.”

IDEAS ARE
FOOD

“all had a reoccuring theme of food”

THEORIES
ARE
BUILDINGS

“all of the sentences were based on a theme of
construction or were about some sort of a
structural element”

TIME IS
MONEY

“looking for a theme (in this case, time &&
money)”

“All of these sentences were about
relationships, so I thought about my own
relationships that I have experienced while
reading the sentences. I also realized that many
of the sentences were using the analogy of a
‘road or a car (i.i.e. bumps in the road, etc. so I
was consciously not trying to be fooled by any
sentences about cars when asked if I remember
the new sentences.”
*Note: Although these words are related to the two domains, they were all words actually
contained in the presented sentences. Because the participant did not report extracting a
theme, the strategy was categorized as “neither domain.”
LOVE IS A
JOURNEY
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Ninety-one of the 148 responses (61%) were categorized as attending to neither domain
indicating that most of the time participants did not explicitly report consciously
attending to either domain of the conceptual metaphor. The next most common response
was attending to the target domain, but not mentioning the source domain (30 out of 148,
or 20%). Lastly, it was fairly uncommon that the source domain (17 out of 148, or 11%)
or both domains (10 out of 148, or 7%) were explicitly mentioned as a strategy.
Because it was so infrequent that participants reported attending to either the source
domain or to both domains, there were not enough observations to conduct meaningful
analyses on whether the strategies affected false recognition. However, I did conduct an
ANOVA that excluded the trials in which the cross-domain mapping was consciously
noticed, that is, when the participant reported attending to both domains. Even with these
trials removed, there was still a significant main effect of lure type, F(2.75, 98.92) =
12.30, p < .001, η²ₚ = .255. Planned comparison t-tests revealed that the proportion of
false recognition for the critical consistent lures (.29) was significantly higher than for the
control metaphor (.10), control literal (.16), and unrelated (.05) lures, all t(36)’s > 2.9, p’s
< .01.

3.3.2

Final recognition test

One participant identified every item as new on the final recognition test and was
therefore removed from all subsequent analyses. Thus, the analyses reported below are
based on 73 participants.

3.3.2.1

Preliminary analysis

The four related lure types (critical CM, critical consistent, control literal, and control
metaphor) were examined to see if they differed in baseline false recognition. I first
examined the previously tested lures7 using a 2 (condition: strategy vs. no-strategy) x 4

7

Previously tested and untested lures had to be analysed separately because there were no
observations for previously untested critical CM lures unrelated to the study lists. Recall that
there was only one critical CM lure for each study list, and if this study list was the one not
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(lure type) ANOVA. The main effect of lure type approached significance, F(2.70,
191.48) = 2.22, p = .094, which seemed to be driven by higher false recognition for the
critical consistent and control metaphor lures (.23 and .22 respectively) compared to the
critical CM and control literal lures (.16 and .14 respectively; see Appendix F for full
breakdown of remember, know, and guess judgments). There was no significant main
effect of condition, F(1, 71) = 0.00, p = .976, nor a significant interaction between
condition and lure type, F(2.70, 191.48) = 0.58, p = .613.
For the previously untested lures, there were only baseline false recognition data for three
of the lure types (critical consistent: .05, control metaphor: .08, and control literal: .02). A
2 x 3 ANOVA indicated that false recognition did not vary significantly by lure type,
F(1.61, 114.06) = 1.47, p = .235, nor by condition, F(1, 71) = 1.90, p = .173, nor was
there a significant interaction between the two factors, F(1.61, 114.06) = 0.20, p = .766.
This confirms that the lure types did not differ significantly when they were not
associated to any of the presented study lists.

3.3.2.2

Main analysis

The proportion (and SD) of items identified as old for actual old items as well as the five
lure types for the final recognition test are displayed in Table 3.7, along with the
proportion (and SD) of remember, know, and guess judgments.

presented to participants, then this critical CM lure would have been used as an unrelated lure on
one of the initial recognition tests.
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Table 3.7. Proportion (and SD) of items identified as old, as well as proportion (and SD)
of items remembered, known, and guessed for final recognition test in Chapter 3.
Proportions are presented by previous testing status (i.e., whether or not the lure had been
tested in the initial recognition tests) and item type. Note: data are collapsed across
condition, as there were no significant main effects nor interactions with condition.
Previously
Item type
Old
Remember
Know
Guess
Tested
Yes
Old
.80(.13)
.46(.24)
.26(.23)
.08(.09)

No

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old

.39(.33)
.52(.23)
.33(.25)
.28(.25)
.19(.23)
.34(.19)
.60(.17)

.17(.27)
.21(.20)
.15(.20)
.12(.17)
.06(.14)
.14(.14)
.33(.18)

.12(.25)
.16(.18)
.10(.14)
.08(.16)
.06(.12)
.11(.12)
.18(.16)

.10(.23)
.15(.16)
.07(.10)
.08(.11)
.07(.11)
.09(.09)
.09(.09)

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition

.18(.28)
.22(.24)
.10(.16)
.05(.09)
.04(.10)
.12(.11)

.09(.21)
.09(.16)
.04(.09)
.01(.04)
.02(.08)
.05(.08)

.03(.15)
.05(.14)
.02(.07)
.01(.03)
.01(.04)
.02(.06)

.06(.17)
.08(.14)
.04(.10)
.03(.07)
.02(.07)
.05(.07)

For overall false recognition, a 2 x 2 x 5 ANOVA was conducted with condition (strategy
vs. no-strategy) as a between-subjects factor and repetition (i.e., whether the item was
previously tested; yes vs. no) and lure type as within-subjects factors. There were
significant main effects of both lure type, F(2.80, 198.86) = 39.24, p < .001, η²ₚ = .356,
and repetition, F(1, 71) = 154.15, p < .001, η²ₚ = .685. There was also a significant
interaction between lure type and repetition, F(2.74, 194.48) = 2.94, p = .039, η²ₚ = .040.
All other main effects and interactions failed to reach significance (all F’s < 2.7, p’s >
.1).
The interaction between lure type and repetition indicates that the effect of repetition
varied across lure type. To examine this interaction, I subtracted the proportion of false
recognition for non-repeated lures from repeated lures within each of the lure types for
each participant. The difference can be interpreted as the effect of repetition on false
recognition; the greater the value, the greater the increase in false recognition due to
repetition. I then conducted paired t-tests to compare the differences across the lure types.
Alpha was adjusted to .005 for ten comparisons. The t-tests revealed that the difference
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was smaller for unrelated lures (.15) than for critical consistent lures (.29) and control
literal lures (.23), both t(72)’s > 3.2, p’s < .003. This indicates that repetition led to a
larger increase in false recognition for critical consistent and control literal lures than it
did for unrelated lures. None of the other comparisons reached significance, t’s < 2.6, p’s
> .01. Regarding the other two lure types, repetition led to a .21 increase in false
recognition for critical CM lures and a .22 increase for control metaphor lures. Therefore,
it seems that the more effective the lure is in evoking false recognition, the larger the
effect of repetition. The lure with the highest proportion of false recognition (critical
consistent) showed the largest increase in false recognition from repetition, and the lure
with the lowest proportion of false recognition (unrelated) showed the smallest increase.
Separate sets of planned comparison t-tests were conducted for repeated and nonrepeated lures to compare the critical lures to the three controls (alpha = .025). As there
was no main effect of or interactions with condition (strategy vs. no-strategy), the data
are collapsed across this variable. The critical consistent lures were falsely recognized
significantly more often than all three control lures for both repeated [all t(72)’s > 6.3, p’s
< .001] and non-repeated [t(72)’s > 3.6, p’s < .001] lures. For repeated lures, the critical
CM lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than both the control literal
and unrelated lures [both t(72)’s > 2.4, p’s < .02], but did not differ significantly from the
control metaphor lures, t(72) = 1.61, p = .111. For non-repeated lures, the critical CM
lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than all three control lures, all
t(72)’s > 2.4, p’s < .02.

3.3.2.3

Phenomenological experience of false recognition

The percentages of remember, know, and guess judgments within correctly recognized
presented items and falsely recognized lures are presented in Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within
correct or false recognitions for the final recognition test in Chapter 3. Percentages are
presented by repetition (previously tested vs. untested) and by item type.
Previously
Item Type
%R
%K
%G
Tested
Yes
Old (actual presented)
57%
33%
10%

No

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

44%
41%
47%
43%
33%
42%
55%

32%
30%
32%
29%
31%
31%
30%

25%
29%
21%
28%
37%
27%
16%

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition

48%
40%
37%
23%
38%
38%

19%
23%
20%
13%
15%
19%

33%
37%
43%
63%
46%
43%

The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within false recognitions were
examined for both repeated and non-repeated lures. Chi-square analyses (3: remember,
know, or guess; by 5: lure type) revealed that the R/K/G percentages within false
recognitions did not vary significantly for either repeated lures, ꭓ²(8) = 10.67, p = .221, or
non-repeated lures, ꭓ²(8) = 7.74, p = .459. These findings parallel the results from the
initial recognition tests, suggesting that once lures are falsely recognized, they produce
similar phenomenological experience of recognition.
Chi-square analyses (2: correct vs. false recognition; by 3: remember, know, or guess)
were also conducted to examine the phenomenological experience of correct recognition
for presented items vs. false recognition for lures (regardless of lure type). The chi-square
test was significant both for previously tested items, ꭓ²(2) = 146.86, p < .001, and
untested items, ꭓ²(2) = 66.46, p < .001. Posthoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (alpha =
.008) within the previously tested items indicated that the “remember” and “guess” cells
for both correct and false recognition differed significantly from expected values, z’s >
7.3, p’s < .001. This indicates that false recognitions were attributed a significantly higher
percentage of guess responses and significantly lower percentage of remember responses
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than correct recognitions. Within previously untested items, similar posthoc tests revealed
that all six cells deviated significantly from expected values, z’s > 2.65, p’s < .008. This
indicates that false recognitions were attributed a significantly higher percentage of guess
responses and a significantly lower percentage of remember and know responses.

3.4

Discussion

Chapter 3 replicated the major findings described in Chapter 2. Once again, the critical
consistent lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than all control lures.
This finding was observed both on the initial and final recognition tests. Furthermore, this
study ruled out the possibility that the conceptual metaphor false memory effect was due
to differences in baseline false recognition by comparing the four related lure types when
they were not associated to the presented study list.
Notably, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than controls
even for non-repeated expressions on the final recognition test. The non-repeated lures
are analogous to the initial recognition test lures as neither set of lures had been seen
before. This essentially replicated the conceptual metaphor false memory effect for the
critical consistent lures with a second set of items, indicating that the effect is fairly
robust and not just due to the particular lures used in the initial recognition task. It also
suggests that the effect is relatively long lasting as it occurred after the presentation of
several lists.
The effect when the lure is the statement reflecting the CM itself is less robust. Unlike
Chapter 2, the critical CM lures were not falsely recognized more often than control lures
on the initial recognition tests. One can speculate on why these lures might induce less
false recognitions than critical consistent lures. First, unlike the critical consistent lures,
most of the CM lures are not conversational in nature and somewhat novel sounding.
Arguably, the novelty of these expressions may be a cue to reject these items as “old.”
Second, these items all use the “A is B” form. Although we included a few “A is B”
expressions on each study list to try to minimize this as a potential cue for rejecting
critical CM lures, the majority of the study list expressions did not use this form.
Therefore, this could be another feature of critical CM lures that participants use to reject
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these items as “old.” Finally, critical CM’s represent a superordinate category whereas
the presented study list items and critical consistent lures are basic-level exemplars of the
category. Lures at a different category level from study list items are known to be less
effective than lures at the same category level (Park, Shobe, & Kihlstrom, 2005). For our
stimuli, although some of the critical CM’s are also exemplar expressions of the
mapping, such as “love is a journey” (Lakoff, 1993), most are not.8 Therefore, the finding
that the conceptual metaphors themselves are not frequently falsely remembered is
actually consistent with previous research on the DRM paradigm, though it remains
unclear why it occurred in the data presented in Chapter 2.
The results from the remember-know-guess judgments are both consistent and
inconsistent with typical DRM studies employing word lists. False recognitions were
attributed a significantly lower percentage of “remember” judgments than correct
recognitions, which is typical of DRM studies (see Gallo, 2006, p. 79). However, unlike
previous findings, the critical lures did not have a higher percentage of remember
judgments within false recognitions than the control lures. Typically, false recognitions
of critical lures have a higher percentage of remember judgments compared to false
recognitions of unrelated lures in DRM studies (Gallo, 2006). Whereas some
manipulations selectively influence either recollection or familiarity (e.g., Gardiner,
1988; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000), it appears that conceptual metaphor
activation increases both illusory recollection and familiarity.
The observation here that the percentages of remember, know, and guess responses were
similar across all lure types suggests that conceptual metaphor activation may be a
weaker manipulation for inducing false memories that have the characteristics of “real”
memories, compared to other manipulations, such as creating lists based on associative

8

Lakoff (1993) points out that the conceptual metaphor labels, such as IDEAS ARE FOOD and
LOVE IS A JOURNEY are “used as mnemonics to name the mappings” (p. 7). Therefore, these
labels themselves are likely not part of any participant’s lexicon, except in cases like LOVE IS A
JOURNEY and TIME IS MONEY in which the label of the mapping is also a conventional
expression. It should be noted that the label is a name for the conceptual metaphor, which is a set
of correspondences between two domains; the label itself is not the conceptual metaphor.
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strength as in the classic DRM task (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roediger, Watson,
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001), or employing lure sentences that capture the same meaning
or idea as the presented sentences while also sharing many overlapping words (Bransford
& Franks, 1971). Note that in the current study, the critical lures were full sentences not
highly similar to their study lists in terms of word-based similarity, and that the presented
items were displayed for a longer duration than is typical in DRM studies, which is a
factor known to reduce false memories (Gallo & Roediger, 2002).9 For these reasons, the
current study lists and lures may not induce the compelling false recollective effects that
often occur with DRM word lists.
Although the critical consistent lures did not differ from the control lures in terms of the
remember-know-guess percentages, they were attributed a higher combined percentage of
“know” and “guess” judgments than “remember” judgments. “Know” and “guess”
judgments likely both tap into familiarity, albeit at different levels of confidence
(Hirshman, 1998; Yonelinas, 2002). The high percentage of familiarity-based false
recognitions are suggestive of automatic activation, which is consistent with the original
CMT. This finding also supports a processing fluency explanation for the conceptual
metaphor false memory effect (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989;
Kelley & Jacoby, 1998) which is consistent with automatic conceptual metaphor
activation. In fact, fluency effects are eliminated when the participant is aware of the
source of fluency (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). That being said, familiarity-based false
recognition is also consistent with fuzzy-trace theory as false alarms are assumed to be
based on gist-similarity (i.e., lures being consistent with the gist, or fuzzy meaning, of the
presented items), which is thought to evoke feelings of familiarity (Brainerd, Reyna, &
Mojardin, 1999). Although, on face, the high percentage of familiarity-based false
recognitions is consistent with the original CMT, this should not be taken as definitive
evidence as the low percentage of false “remembering” could be due to the
methodological reasons outlined above.

9

The longer presentation duration was necessary simply because full sentences take longer to
read than single words.
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The strategy descriptions provide more compelling evidence for CMT over DMT as they
suggest that most of the time, participants do not report attending to either domain of the
conceptual metaphor. Attending to both domains was infrequently reported (7%), and
even when these trials were removed, there was still evidence of a conceptual metaphor
false memory effect. This suggests that the effect does not depend on the participant
consciously extracting the metaphorical mapping. This finding does not support Steen’s
(2009) argument that cross-domain metaphor mappings only occur when participants are
consciously aware a metaphor is being used, and instead aligns with the original
assumption of CMT that most metaphorical cognition is unconscious (see Lakoff, 1993).
Although the strategy questionnaire more strongly supports an automaticity basis for the
conceptual metaphor false memory effect, the evidence is also indirect and nonexperimental. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I examine automaticity more directly by
manipulating attention with a concurrent task administered at study.
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Chapter 4

4

Examining the automaticity of the conceptual metaphor
false memory effect using a divided attention task
4.1

Introduction

Although the findings described in the previous two chapters support CMT, it remains
unclear whether conceptual metaphors are activated automatically or require conscious
processing. Neither the R/K/G judgments, nor the Chapter 3 strategy analysis provided
definitive answers, though the high frequency of attending to “neither” the source or
target domain in the strategy analysis is more suggestive of automatic processes. To
directly test the role of automatic versus conscious processing in the conceptual metaphor
false memory effect, participants engaged in a concurrent task to divide attention.
Divided attention inhibits conscious and deliberate processing but typically has little to
no detrimental effect on automatic processing (Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2001). Knott
and Dewhurst (2007) examined the effects of divided attention on false memory with
DRM lists and found that divided attention reduced false memories during the study
phase, but increased them at test. Furthermore, these effects were isolated to “remember”
responses; “know” responses were unaffected. Knott and Dewhurst argued that false “R”
responses depend on the participants making semantic associations between the study
words, and that dividing attention hinders making these associations. In contrast, dividing
attention at test actually increases false “R” judgments because it inhibits controlled
source monitoring decisions. Pimentel and Albuquerque (2013) divided attention during
encoding of DRM lists using dichotic listening procedures and found that false memory
for critical lures occurs even under minimal attention, suggesting also that the critical
lures are activated automatically.
Lakoff (1993, 2008) argues that conceptual metaphors are activated automatically upon
encountering metaphorical expressions. If this is the case, the expressions from the study
list should activate the corresponding conceptual metaphor even under divided attention.
Therefore, for Chapter 4, half of the participants engaged in a concurrent task at study
that divided their attention and half completed the study with full attention. The same
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pattern of results for the two groups will suggest that conceptual metaphors are activated
automatically, similar to the argument Pimentel and Albuquerque (2013) make for
automatic activation of critical lures. However, if conceptual metaphors require deliberate
and conscious processing, dividing attention should eliminate the conceptual metaphor
false memory effect.

4.2
4.2.1

Method
Participants

One hundred and two participants (65 females; Sample Age: M = 19.87, SD = 4.67, range
= 18-57) completed the experiment. Some participants (N = 64, 38 females; Sample Age:
M = 18.45, SD = 0.82, range = 18-21) were recruited through the Psychology
Department’s Sona systems website and participated in partial fulfillment of course
credit. The other participants (N = 38, 27 females; Sample Age: M = 22.26, SD = 7.00,
range = 18-57) were recruited via posters placed around the Western University campus
and were compensated $5 for participating. Preliminary analyses indicated that whether
the participant was paid or not did not significantly affect overall recognition
performance or the pattern of false recognition, so the recruitment type variable will not
be included in any subsequent analyses. Two participants (2 females; one 18-year-old
paid participant and one 19-year-old Sona participant) from the divided attention
condition were removed from analysis due to poor performance on the concurrent task.
These participants were replaced by two other participants yielding a final sample of 100
participants (N = 100, 63 females; Age: M = 19.90, SD = 4.71, range = 18-57) with 63
Sona participants (37 females; Age: M = 18.44, SD = 0.82, range = 18-21) and 37 paid
participants (26 females, Age: M = 22.38, SD = 7.06, range = 18-57). The full and
divided attention conditions each included 50 participants.
To ensure that the sample size was sufficiently large to detect an interactive effect of lure
type and attention, a power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Based on the data from the initial recognition test in Chapter 3,
the correlation among repeated measures was estimated at .40 and the non-sphericity
correction ε was set to .741. The former value was based on the correlation of
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participants’ false recognition proportions for the five different lure types and the latter
value was based on the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. The power analysis indicated that
given a total sample size of 100 and a medium effect size of f = .25 (Cohen, 1988), the
likelihood of detecting a significant interaction was over 99%.

4.2.2

Materials

The same study lists and recognition tests employed in Chapter 3 were used in the current
study.

4.2.3

Procedure

Testing was done on an Asus (processor: intel core i5-7500; screen resolution: 1440 x
900) desktop computer using the E-Prime 2.0 software package. The study consisted of a
between-subjects condition with two levels: full vs. divided attention. Due to the small
number of lists in the current study, a between-subjects design was employed (as
employed in Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012; Pérez-Mata, Read, & Diges, 2002).
Participants were randomly assigned to the full and divided attention conditions. The
procedure for the full attention condition was identical to the procedure for the “nostrategy” condition described in Chapter 3. For the divided attention condition,
participants engaged in a task used by Dewhurst, Barry, Swannell, Holmes, and Bathurst
(2007) in a DRM task, namely to generate and say aloud a string of random numbers
between 1 and 20 on pace with a metronome that ticked every 1 second at the same time
they were silently reading the study list items. In this random number generating (RNG)
task, participants were told to keep the numbers as random as possible with no obvious
patterns or repetition and they had the opportunity to first practice this without having to
read a list at the same time. The experimenter monitored the participants throughout the
experiment as they did the RNG task to ensure the participants stayed on beat with the
metronome and did not continually produce obvious patterns or repetitions. For both
conditions, remaining aspects of the procedure were the same as employed in Chapters 2
and 3.
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Results

4.3
4.3.1

Preliminary analyses

Two preliminary analyses were conducted. First, baseline false recognition for the four
related lure types was examined in both conditions, as done in Chapter 3. Second, correct
recognition of old items and false alarms for unrelated lures were examined between the
attention conditions to ensure the divided attention task significantly influenced memory.

4.3.1.1
4.3.1.1.1

Baseline false recognition
Initial recognition tests

The proportion of items falsely recognized for the four lure types when tested following
an unrelated list are displayed in Table 4.1 (see Appendix G for proportion of items
attributed remember, know, and guess judgments).
Table 4.1. Proportion (and SD) of false recognition by lure type when lures followed an
unrelated study list on the initial recognition tests of Chapter 4.
Condition
Lure type
Old
Full
Crit CM
.04(.20)
attention
Crit consistent
.07(.20)
Cont metaphor
.05(.15)
Cont literal
.05(.15)
Total full attention
.05(.09)
Divided
Crit CM
.20(.40)
attention
Crit consistent
.30(.34)
Cont metaphor
.31(.33)
Cont literal
.24(.29)
Total divided attention
.26(.17)
Note: Totals represent the average of the four unrelated lure types’ averages.
A 2 (between-subjects condition: full vs. divided attention) by 4 (within-subjects: lure
type) ANOVA indicated that false recognition did not vary significantly by lure type,
F(3, 294) = 1.27, p = .285. There was however a significant main effect of condition, F(1,
98) = 58.26, p < .001, η²ₚ = .37, as the proportion of false recognition across all lure types
was significantly higher for the divided attention group (.26) than for the full attention
group (.05). However, the interaction between condition and lure type was not
significant, F(3, 294) = 0.65, p = .583, indicating that there was no facilitated false
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recognition for any of the lure types when the conceptual metaphor was not primed at
study.

4.3.1.1.2

Final recognition test

The proportions of false recognition for unrelated lures are displayed in Table 4.2 (see
Appendix H for full breakdown of remember, know, and guess responses).
Table 4.2. Proportion (and SD) of false recognition by lure type for the final recognition
test when lures were unrelated to any of the presented study lists. Proportions are broken
down by previous testing status and condition.
Previously
Condition
Lure type
Old
tested
Yes
Full
Crit CM
.12(.33)
attention
Crit consistent
.26(.34)
Cont metaphor
.21(.32)
Cont literal
.22(.32)
Total full attention
.20(.22)
Divided
Crit CM
.36(.48)
attention
Crit consistent
.35(.37)
Cont metaphor
.48(.38)
Cont literal
.40(.40)
Total divided attention
.40(.25)
No
Full
Crit consistent
.04(.20)
attention
Cont metaphor
.12(.33)
Cont literal
.02(.10)
Total full attention
.06(.13)
Divided
Crit consistent
.12(.33)
attention
Cont metaphor
.26(.44)
Cont literal
.16(.28)
Total divided attention
.18(.24)
Note: Totals represent the average of the unrelated lure types’ averages.
For the previously tested lures, a 2 (between-subjects condition: full vs. divided attention)
by 4 (within-subjects: lure type) ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition, F(1, 98) =
17.58, p < .001, η²ₚ = .15, as the divided attention group had a higher proportion of false
recognitions than the full attention group (.40 vs. .20 respectively). However, once again
false recognition did not vary significantly by lure type, F(3, 294) = 1.71, p = .165, and
condition and lure type did not interact, F(3, 294) = 1.41, p = .241.
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For the previously untested lures, a 2 by 3 (lure type; no previously untested critical CM
lures) ANOVA indicated significant main effects of lure type, F(1.69, 165.45) = 4.77, p =
.014, η²ₚ = .05, and attention, F(1, 98) = 9.54, p = .003, η²ₚ = .089, as there was a higher
proportion of false recognition for the divided attention condition (.18) than the full
attention condition (.06). Attention and lure type did not interact, F(1.69, 165.45) = 0.39,
p = .644. Least Significant Difference posthoc tests comparing the lure types revealed
that the proportion of false recognition was significantly higher for the control metaphor
lures (.19) than both the critical consistent lures (.09) and control literal lures (.08), both
p’s < .025. The critical consistent lures and the control literal lures did not differ
significantly (p = .770).
In summary, the critical lures were not more likely to induce false recognitions at
baseline (when unrelated to any of the presented study lists) than the control lures.
Therefore, in the following analyses for both the initial and final recognition tests, if the
critical lures induce more false recognitions than the control lures, it can be attributed to
the presence of conceptual metaphors and cannot be attributed to pre-existing differences
in the lures’ abilities to evoke false recognitions, regardless of conceptual metaphor
activation.

4.3.1.2

Overall recognition performance

To examine the effects of the divided attention manipulation, analyses were conducted on
correct recognition of presented items and false alarms to unrelated lures. Divided
attention typically has a negative influence on memory, and especially on recollection
(Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2001), so both recognition and remember, know, and guess
judgments were examined to determine if the RNG task significantly affected memory in
the standard way.

4.3.1.2.1

Initial recognition tests

The proportion of items categorized as old for presented items (correct recognitions) and
unrelated lures (false alarms) by condition are displayed in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3. Proportion of correct recognitions for presented items and false alarms for
unrelated lures by condition (full vs. divided attention) for the initial recognition tests.
Item type
Condition
Old
Presented
Full attention
.85(.10)
Divided attention
.60(.13)
10
Full attention
.05(.10)
Unrelated
Divided attention
.27(.17)
Note: Unrelated proportions are the average collapsed across lure type.
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with attention condition (full vs. divided) as a betweensubjects factor, item type (presented vs. unrelated) as a within-subjects factor, and
proportion identified as “old” as the dependent variable. There was a significant main
effect of item type, F(1, 98) = 868.60, p < .001, η²ₚ = .90, but more critically, there was a
significant interaction, F(1, 98) = 154.08, p < .001, η²ₚ = .61. Simple t-tests with
Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .025) revealed that divided attention both significantly
decreased correct recognitions, t(98) = -11.13, p < .001, d = 2.23, and increased unrelated
false alarms, t(77.30)11 = 7.92, p < .001, Glass’s Δ = 2.28, indicating that the
manipulation had the strong expected detrimental effect on memory performance.
Within correct recognitions, the phenomenological experience differed significantly
between the attention conditions. A 2 (condition: divided vs. full attention) x 3 (response:
remember, know, or guess) chi-square test revealed that the percentage of remember,
know, and guess responses differed significantly between the two conditions (full

10

Note that the unrelated proportions from Table 4.3 differ slightly from the totals in
Table 4.1. This is because the totals in Table 4.1 are the average of the averages for the
four unrelated subtypes. This makes the most sense for analysing differences between the
unrelated types; however, because there were no main effects or interactions with lure
type for unrelated lures, in the main recognition analyses the unrelated lures are collapsed
across type (in other words, the average from all the unrelated lures, regardless of type).
This leads to slightly different values because there are an unequal number of unrelated
lure subtypes. There is only one unrelated critical CM lure, but two lures each for the
other unrelated types.
11

Degrees of freedom adjusted due to unequal variances between groups. For this reason,
Glass’s Δ was used to measure effect size rather than Cohen’s d, the latter of which
assumes equal variances between groups. Glass’s Δ uses only the standard deviation from
the control group, which in this case was the full attention group.
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attention: R = 54%, K = 35%, and G = 11%; divided attention: R = 47%, K = 30%, G =
23%), ꭓ²(2) = 56.03, p < .001. Posthoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .008 for
examining 6 cells) revealed that the “remember” and “guess” cells in both conditions
significantly deviated from the expected counts (z’s > 3.1, p’s < .008), meaning that
divided attention led to an increased percentage of guesses and a decreased percentage of
remember responses attributed to correctly recognized items.

4.3.1.2.2

Final recognition test

The proportion of items categorized as old for presented items and unrelated lures on the
final recognition test are displayed in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4. Proportion of correct recognition and false alarms for unrelated lures by
condition (full vs. divided attention) and repetition (whether or not the item had been
tested on one of the initial recognition tests).
Item Type
Repeated
Attention
Old
Presented
Yes
Full
.77(.17)
Divided
.50(.21)
No
Full
.60(.18)
Divided
.29(.18)
Unrelated
Yes
Full
.21(.22)
Divided
.40(.25)
No
Full
.05(.11)
Divided
.18(.23)
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with condition (full vs. divided attention) as a
between-subjects factor and repetition (previously tested: yes vs. no) and item type
(presented item vs. unrelated lure) as within-subjects factors. The ANOVA revealed
significant main effects of condition: F(1, 98) = 5.76, p = .018, η²ₚ = .06; repetition: F(1,
98) = 158.75, p < .001, η²ₚ = .62; and item type, F(1, 98) = 291.47, p < .001, η²ₚ = .75,
and a marginally significant interaction between repetition and condition, F(1, 98) = 3.62,
p = .060, η²ₚ = .04. More critically however, there was a significant interaction between
item type and condition, F(1, 98) = 136.00, p < .001, η²ₚ = .58. Simple t-tests with
Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .013) revealed that divided attention significantly
decreased correct recognitions for presented items that were both repeated, t(98) = -6.95,
p < .001, d = 1.39, and non-repeated, t(98) = -8.79, p < .001, d = 1.76, but increased false
alarms for both repeated unrelated lures, t(98) = 4.07, p < .001, d = 0.81, and for non-
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repeated unrelated lures, t(70.85) = 3.42, p = .001, Glass’s Δ = 1.11.12 Similar to the
initial recognition tests, the decrease in correct recognition and the increase in false
alarms indicates that divided attention led to significantly poorer memory. None of the
other interactions reached significance (all F’s < 1, p’s > .7).
Within the correct recognitions, a 2 (condition) x 3 (response: remember, know, or guess)
chi-square test revealed that the percentage of remember, know, and guess responses
differed significantly between the two conditions (full attention: R = 55%, K = 34%, and
G = 11%; divided attention: R = 49%, K = 27%, G = 24%), ꭓ²(2) = 84.47, p < .001.
Posthoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .008) revealed that all six cells differed
significantly from the expected values, all z’s > 2.7, p’s < .008. This indicates that
dividing attention decreased the percentage of both remember and know judgments and
increased the percentage of guess judgments. Both remember and know judgments are
indicative of greater confidence in memory judgments, and therefore, the decrease in
these judgments and increase in guesses suggests that even when participants were
correct, they were less sure of their judgments when attention was divided.

4.3.2

Main analyses

4.3.2.1

Initial recognition tests

The proportion (and SD) of items falsely identified as old for the five lure types, and the
proportion (and SD) of remember (R), know (K), and guess (G) judgments are displayed
in Table 4.5.

12

Degrees of freedom adjusted and Glass’s Δ used for effect size due to unequal variances.
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Table 4.5. Proportion of false recognition and remember, know, and guess judgments by
attention condition and lure type for initial recognition tests.
Condition
Item type
Old
R
K
G
Full
Crit CM
.19(.28)
.08(.19)
.06(.19)
.05(.15)
attention
Crit consistent
.28(.21)
.07(.12)
.08(.12)
.14(.16)
Cont metaphor
.14(.15)
.03(.07)
.04(.09)
.07(.11)
Cont literal
.11(.13)
.03(.07)
.02(.05)
.06(.09)
Unrelated
.05(.10)
.01(.05)
.01(.04)
.03(.08)
Total
.16(.12)
.04(.07)
.04(.06)
.07(.07)
Divided
Crit CM
.37(.36)
.17(.28)
.11(.21)
.09(.19)
attention
Crit consistent
.49(.21)
.18(.15)
.14(.15)
.17(.16)
Cont metaphor
.37(.22)
.12(.14)
.10(.16)
.15(.16)
Cont literal
.38(.23)
.14(.14)
.08(.11)
.16(.15)
Unrelated
.27(.17)
.10(.14)
.06(.10)
.11(.13)
Total
.38(.15)
.14(.10)
.10(.10)
.14(.09)
The false recognition data here follows a trend similar to those presented in Chapters 2
and 3. For full attention, the critical consistent lures again had about twice as many false
recognitions as the control metaphor and literal lures. For divided attention, the critical
consistent lures were also falsely recognized more often than controls, but divided
attention increased false recognitions for all lure types. Nonetheless, even with increased
false recognition for controls, the proportion of false recognition for the critical consistent
lures was still .12 higher than the control metaphor lures and .11 higher than the control
literal lures, which is comparable to all three full attention studies (Chapter 2, 3, and the
full attention condition in the current chapter).
A 2 (between-subjects: condition) x 5 (within-subjects: lure type) ANOVA with false
recognition as the dependent variable revealed significant main effects of lure type,
F(2.79, 273.77) = 18.24, p < .001, η²ₚ = .16, and condition, F(1, 98) = 63.49, p < .001, η²ₚ
= .39. Critically, there was not a significant interaction, F(2.79, 273.77) = 0.71, p = .539,
confirming that the pattern of false recognition across lure types did not differ
appreciably in the divided and full attention conditions.
The pattern of false recognition was examined further with separate sets of planned
comparisons within the two attention conditions. Alpha was divided by two for
comparing the two critical lures against each of the three control lures (literal, metaphor,
and unrelated), yielding an adjusted alpha of .025. The critical consistent lures were
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falsely recognized significantly more often than each of the three control lures for both
full attention [all t(49)’s > 4.9, p’s < .001] and divided attention [all t(49)’s > 3.2, p’s <
.002]. The critical CM lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than the
unrelated lures under full attention, t(49) = 3.63, p < .001, but did not differ significantly
from the control metaphor or control literal lures, both t(49)’s < 2.0, p’s > .06. Under
divided attention, the critical CM lures did not differ significantly from any of the three
control lures, all t(49)’s < 1.9, p’s > .06. The critical finding here is that under both full
and divided attention, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than
all three controls, suggesting that the conceptual metaphor false memory effect was still
evident even when conscious processing was limited.

4.3.2.1.1

Phenomenological experience of false recognition

The percentages of remember, know, and guess judgments within correctly recognized
presented items and falsely recognized lures by condition are displayed in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within
correct or false recognitions for the initial recognition tests in Chapter 4. Percentages are
presented by attention condition (full vs. divided) and item type.
Condition
Item type
%R
%K
%G
Full attention
Old (actual presented)
54%
35%
11%

Divided attention

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

42%
23%
23%
30%
26%
26%
47%

32%
28%
25%
20%
21%
26%
30%

26%
49%
52%
50%
53%
48%
23%

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition

46%
37%
32%
37%
36%
36%

30%
28%
27%
20%
22%
25%

24%
35%
41%
43%
42%
39%

Separate 3 (remember, know, or guess) by 5 (lure types) chi-square tests for both
attention conditions revealed that the five lure types did not differ in terms of R/K/G
percentages for either full attention, ꭓ²(8) = 6.01, p = .646, or divided attention, ꭓ²(8) =
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9.37, p = .312. This suggests that when lures were falsely recognized, the
phenomenological experience of the false recognition did not differ significantly between
the different lures types. Compared to correct recognitions however, 2 (false vs. correct
recognition) x 3 (remember, know, and guess) chi-square tests revealed that the R/K/G
percentages differed significantly for correct recognition and false recognition under both
full attention, ꭓ²(2) = 212.70, p < .001, and divided attention, ꭓ²(2) = 48.21, p < .001. For
full attention, posthoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .008) revealed that all
six cells differed significantly from expected values, all z’s > 2.7, p’s < .008. This
indicates that false recognitions were attributed a significantly higher percentage of
guesses and a significantly lower percentage of both remember and know responses than
correct recognitions. For divided attention, similar posthoc tests revealed that the
“remember” and “guess” cells for both full attention and divided attention differed
significantly from expected values, all z’s > 4.4, p’s < .001, but that the “know” cells did
not, both z’s = 2.11, p’s = .035. This indicates that false recognitions were attributed a
significantly higher percentage of guesses and a significantly lower percentage of
remember judgments compared to correct recognitions. Therefore, relative to false
recognitions and under both full attention and divided attention, correct recognitions were
more based on recollection, which is consistent with previous DRM findings (Gallo,
2006).

4.3.2.2

Final recognition test

The proportion of false recognition and remember, know, and guess judgments for the
final recognition test are displayed in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7. Proportion of false recognition and remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G)
judgments, by condition, repetition (previously tested vs. untested), and lure type.
Condition Repeated Item type
Old
R
K
G
Full
Yes
Crit CM
.44(.41)
.24(.34) .11(.25) .09(.22)
attention
Crit consistent
.55(.26)
.20(.21) .20(.20) .16(.16)
Cont metaphor
.37(.22)
.15(.19) .11(.15) .11(.16)
Control literal
.27(.23)
.10(.15) .10(.16) .07(.12)
Unrelated
.21(.22)
.08(.11) .06(.09) .07(.12)
Total
.37(.19)
.15(.14) .11(.12) .10(.09)
No
Crit CM
.21(.37)
.06(.16) .05(.21) .10(.25)
Crit consistent
.27(.24)
.04(.09) .12(.17) .12(.17)
Cont metaphor
.10(.15)
.03(.08) .03(.08) .05(.10)
Control literal
.05(.12)
.01(.05) .03(.10) .01(.03)
Unrelated
.05(.11)
.01(.04) .02(.07) .03(.09)
Total
.14(.12)
.03(.05) .05(.08) .06(.09)
Divided
Yes
Crit CM
.37(.40)
.18(.30) .10(.23) .09(.22)
attention
Crit consistent
.47(.28)
.21(.21) .12(.12) .15(.17)
Cont metaphor
.44(.21)
.22(.18) .09(.12) .14(.15)
Control literal
.40(.23)
.18(.17) .10(.14) .11(.15)
Unrelated
.40(.25)
.20(.20) .08(.14) .12(.15)
Total
.42(.21)
.20(.15) .10(.12) .12(.10)
No
Crit CM
.21(.29)
.10(.23) .02(.10) .09(.22)
Crit consistent
.28(.24)
.11(.17) .11(.18) .07(.12)
Cont metaphor
.17(.21)
.04(.09) .03(.09) .11(.18)
Control literal
.12(.16)
.04(.09) .02(.05) .07(.12)
Unrelated
.18(.23)
.05(.12) .03(.10) .10(.18)
Total
.19(.16)
.07(.09) .04(.07) .09(.11)
A 2 (between-subjects condition: full vs. divided attention) x 2 (within-subjects: repeated
vs. non-repeated) x 5 (within-subjects: lure type) ANOVA revealed significant main
effects of both repetition, F(1, 98) = 200.87, p < .001, η²ₚ = .67, and lure type, F(2.89,
282.95) = 24.17, p < .001, η²ₚ = .20, as well as a significant two-way interaction between
condition and lure type, F(2.89, 282.95) = 7.62, p < .001, η²ₚ = .07. The main effect of
condition and the other interactions did not reach significance, all F’s < 2.9, p’s > .09.
Separate sets of planned comparison t-tests (alpha = .025) between the critical and control
lures were conducted for each of the four combinations (full attention repeated, full
attention non-repeated, divided attention repeated, and divided attention non-repeated).
For full attention, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than all
three control lures when both repeated [all t(49)’s > 5.1, p’s < .001] and non-repeated [all
t(49)’s > 5.3, p’s < .001]. The repeated critical CM lures were falsely recognized more
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often than the repeated control literal and unrelated lures [both t(49)’s > 2.8, p < .01], but
did not differ significantly from the repeated control metaphor lures, t(49) = 1.22, p =
.229. The non-repeated critical CM lures also were falsely recognized significantly more
often than the non-repeated control literal and unrelated lures [both t(49)’s > 2.8, p < .01],
but did not differ significantly from the non-repeated control metaphor lures, t(49)’s =
2.13, p = .038. In summary, under full attention the critical consistent lures were again
falsely recognized more often than all three control lures, replicating the findings from
Chapters 2 and 3.
In the divided attention condition, for repeated lures, the critical consistent lures were not
falsely recognized significantly more often than any of the three control lures, all t(49)’s
< 1.9, p’s > .05. Similarly, the repeated critical CM lures were not falsely recognized
significantly more often than any of the three repeated control lures [all t(49)’s < 0]13.
For non-repeated lures however, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized
significantly more often than all three control lures [all t(49)’s > 2.6, p’s < .02]. The nonrepeated critical CM lures were falsely recognized more often than the non-repeated
control literal lures, t(49) = 2.39, p = .021, but did not differ significantly from either the
non-repeated control metaphor or unrelated lures [both t(49)’s < 1.0, p’s > .3].
Overall, these findings replicate the previous findings from Chapters 2 and 3 that
expressions that further instantiate study list conceptual metaphors (“critical consistent”
lures) are falsely recognized more often than control lures. The only case in which this
was not replicated was for the previously tested lures on the final recognition test in the
divided attention condition, which will be considered further in the Discussion. However,
in all other cases the conceptual metaphor false memory effect emerged, which highlights
again the robustness of the effect, even under divided attention in which conscious
processing is diminished.

13

t-values here were actually negative as the critical CM lures were falsely recognized less often
than the controls lures.
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4.3.2.2.1

Phenomenological experience of false recognition

The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions of
old items and false recognitions of lures are displayed in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within
correct or false recognitions for the final recognition test in Chapter 4. Percentages are
presented by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), attention conditions (full vs.
divided), and item type.
Condition
Previously Item Type
%R
%K
%G
tested
Full attention
Yes
Old (actual presented)
57%
34%
10%

Divided attention

No

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

55%
36%
40%
38%
39%
39%
50%

25%
36%
29%
38%
27%
33%
34%

20%
28%
31%
25%
35%
28%
15%

Yes

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

29%
15%
30%
25%
10%
21%
50%

24%
43%
25%
55%
40%
38%
29%

48%
43%
45%
20%
50%
41%
21%

No

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

49%
44%
49%
46%
49%
47%
46%

27%
25%
21%
26%
21%
23%
21%

24%
31%
31%
28%
30%
30%
33%

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition

48%
38%
24%
33%
26%
33%

10%
38%
15%
14%
17%
21%

43%
24%
62%
53%
57%
46%
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Separate 3 (remember, know, and guess) x 5 (lure type) chi-square tests were conducted
on the false recognitions within each of the four combinations of attention and repetition
(full-repeated, full-non-repeated, divided-repeated, divided-non-repeated). Alpha was
adjusted to .013 (.05/4) for the four separate analyses. The only case in which the chisquare test reached significance was for non-repeated lures under divided attention, ꭓ²(8)
= 23.58, p = .003 [all other ꭓ²(8)’s < 9.7, p’s > .2]. Posthoc tests with Bonferroni
corrections (alpha = .003 for examining 15 cells) revealed that the “know” and “guess”
cells for the critical consistent lures differed significantly from the expected values. This
indicates that false recognitions of critical consistent lures were attributed a significantly
higher percentage of “know” judgments and a significantly lower percentage of “guess”
judgments compared to the other lure types, possibly suggesting an increased level of
confidence or familiarity. However, it is unclear why this was the case only for nonrepeated lures under divided attention, but none of the other combinations.
Separate 2 (false vs. correct recognition) x 3 (remember, know, or guess) chi-square tests
(alpha = .013) revealed that the R/K/G percentages differed significantly between correct
and false recognition in all four combinations, all ꭓ²(8)’s > 9.8, p’s < .01. Posthoc tests
with Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .008) revealed that in three of the combinations (full
attention/repeated, full attention/non-repeated, and divided attention/non-repeated) false
recognitions were attributed a significantly lower percentage of “remember” judgments
and a significantly higher percentage of “guess” judgments than correct recognitions (all
z’s > 2.7, p’s < .008). For repeated items under divided attention, only the “guess” cells
significantly deviated from expected values (z’s > 3.9, p’s < 001), indicating that false
recognitions were attributed a significantly higher percentage of “guess” judgments
compared to correct recognitions.

4.4

Discussion

The main finding from this study is that the critical consistent lures were falsely
recognized more often than controls even under divided attention. In fact, on the initial
recognition tests, there was no significant interaction between the type of lure and
attention, suggesting that the pattern of false recognition for the different lures did not
vary by level of attention. These data are consistent with the argument that the conceptual
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metaphor false memory effect does not depend on conscious, effortful processing of the
sentences, at least during study. This finding converges with the finding described in
Chapter 3 that participants very infrequently reported consciously attending to the
metaphor mappings in their strategy descriptions. Taken together, this strongly suggests
that conceptual metaphors are automatically activated, and their arousal does not require
conscious and deliberate attention.
The results from the final recognition test paralleled the initial recognition test except in
one case – the repeated lures under divided attention. For this group of lures, the critical
consistent lures were not recognized significantly more often than control lures, thus
eliminating the conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Although the lack of an effect
under these circumstances was unexpected, I offer some speculation on why this was the
case. The repeated lures were seen on the initial recognition tests, and therefore, although
they are considered “lures” in this study, they are not truly “new” items in the sense that
they were encountered previously in the experiment (albeit, not on a study list). Rejecting
repeated lures is somewhat like rejecting misleading information in studies on the
“misinformation effect” (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Cann & Katz, 2005). In this
paradigm, participants first witness an event (e.g., an automobile accident) and then are
asked leading questions about the event that contain incorrect information. On a
following memory test, participants often attribute the misleading information from the
questions to the witnessed event. This can be considered a “source monitoring” error
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) because the information from the follow-up
questions was attributed to an incorrect source (i.e., the witnessed event).
Applied to the current study, the repeated lures could be falsely recognized due to either
relatedness or to failures in source monitoring, that is, misattributing the source of the
lure to the study list. Divided attention has been found to reduce monitoring (Pérez-Mata
et al., 2002), so it is possible that in this anomalous finding, source monitoring errors had
a larger influence on false recognition and drowned out the influence of relatedness.
However, within full attention, participants may have been more aware of the source of
the items and better able to reject the repeated control lures. As a result, relatedness may
have played a larger role in recognition decisions than when attention was divided. This
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may be why the conceptual metaphor false memory effect was observed only under full
attention, but not under divided attention for repeated lures. Furthermore, with nonrepeated lures, previously seeing the lure was not an issue as none of these lures were
tested until this point. With non-repeated lures, the conceptual metaphor false memory
effect was observed even under divided attention. Therefore, for this category of lures,
relatedness likely also played a larger role in recognition decisions as there was not a
more salient factor (i.e., having actually seen the lures) to take precedence.
Regardless of the reasons for differences between repeated and non-repeated lures, the
non-repeated lures are the most informative items on the final recognition test as they
were a new set of lures not yet seen, and therefore, uncontaminated by any prior testing.
Under both divided and full attention, the non-repeated critical consistent lures were
falsely recognized more often than the non-repeated control lures. This suggests that even
under divided attention, the conceptual metaphor false memory effect is fairly long
lasting, persisting after the presentation of intervening study lists.
In contrast to the critical consistent lures, the critical CM lures, that is, the labels for the
non-presented conceptual metaphors themselves, were not consistently falsely recognized
more often than controls. Of course, there were fewer observations of these lures per
participant than the other lures as there can only be one critical CM lure per list (unlike
the other lures where multiple items can be used), which makes it harder to detect
significant differences in the planned comparisons. Nonetheless, in both Chapter 3 and
the current study these lures were not consistently better at inducing false recognition
than control lures, so it is likely they simply are not as effective as the critical consistent
lures.
In terms of the phenomenological experience of false recognition, the five lure types did
not consistently differ in terms of the percentage of remember, know and guess
judgments. Thus, it seems that conceptual metaphor activation increases false recognition
in general, but once a lure is falsely recognized, the experience is the same regardless of
the type of lure it is. This is neither consistent nor inconsistent with CMT as the theory
does not make specific predictions about recollection and familiarity, although the high

75

percentage of combined “know” and “guess” judgments is suggestive of automatic
activation. Unlike some manipulations that selectively affect only recollection or
familiarity, it seems that conceptual metaphor activation just increases false recognition
overall rather than only affecting one type of memory.
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Chapter 5

5

Divided attention at study and test
5.1

Introduction

The purpose of Chapter 5 was to further examine the automaticity of conceptual
metaphor activation, particularly at retrieval. In Chapter 4, attention was divided at study,
when participants were reading and encoding the sentences, but attention was full at test,
when participants were retrieving the sentences from memory and making decisions
whether they thought they had seen each sentence or not. Therefore, it is possible that the
conceptual metaphors were consciously brought to mind at test. Perhaps conceptual
metaphors are encoded unconsciously, but retrieval depends on conscious access.
Furthermore, at test an actual response is required, and it is possible that the conceptual
metaphors need to be consciously accessed when making a response decision to show
effects on cognition.
The original CMT and DMT do not make specific predictions about encoding and
retrieval. However, Glucksberg and colleagues (Glucksberg, Brown, & McGlone, 1993;
Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999) have argued that in other psychological tasks, effects
supportive of CMT may be due to deliberate judgments. In particular, they mention
Nayak and Gibbs’s (1990) idiom choice task in which participants read short paragraphs
that instantiated a conceptual metaphor (e.g., ANGER IS HEAT) and then selected
between two idioms to finish the paragraph, one of which was consistent with the
instantiated conceptual metaphor (e.g., “blew her top”) and one of which was
inconsistent (e.g., “bit his head off”; based on the ANGER IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR
conceptual metaphor). Nayak and Gibbs found that participants more often selected the
consistent idiom to finish the paragraph. This suggested that participants were sensitive to
the conceptual metaphor instantiated in the preceding paragraph, providing evidence for
the psychological reality of conceptual metaphors. However, Glucksberg and colleagues
(Glucksberg et al., 1993; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999) argued that the effect may
depend on the participant having enough time to make a deliberate judgment about the
“fit” of the idiom. In other words, conceptual metaphors may not influence online
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comprehension, but participants may consciously attend to the conceptual metaphors
when making post-comprehension decisions and judgments about the appropriateness of
idioms. Roughly mapped onto the current memory task, the implication may be that
effects supportive of conceptual metaphor activation depend on conscious attention at
retrieval, when recognition judgments are made.

5.2
5.2.1

Method
Participants

There were 172 participants (122 female) aged 17 to 44 (M = 20.69, SD = 4.27) recruited
for this study. Of this number, 101 participated for $10 compensation whereas the other
71 were recruited through the Psychology Department’s Sona system website and
participated in partial fulfillment of course requirements. Of the 172 participants, 2
participants did not complete the study as one paid participant withdrew from the study
and for one Sona participant, the fire alarm for the building went off during the study.
These participants were still compensated ($10 for the paid participant and the course
participation credit for the Sona participant). Two participants were removed because
they completed a previous study in our lab that used similar stimuli. Two additional
participants were removed due to errors by the experimenter.14 Also, six participants
were removed for poor performance on the random number generation task (two
participants each from the divided attention at study, divided attention at test, and divided
attention at both study and test conditions). All of these participants were replaced.
However, after recruitment was completed, two additional participants (one from the
divided attention at study condition and one from the full attention condition) were
removed from analyses due to their performance on the recognition tests (see Results).
Therefore, the final analysed sample consisted of 158 participants (112 female) aged 17
to 44 (M = 20.67, SD = 4.30), 93 of whom were compensated $10 and 65 of whom

14

In one case, the experimenter did not explain the instructions for the remember-know-guess
task to the participant. In the other case, the participant accidently heard the experimenter debrief
the preceding participant, and therefore, knew that the study was dealing with metaphors.
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completed the study for course credit. As described below, there were four independent
groups and the Ns in each group ranged from 39 to 40 (see Table 5.1 below).
I conducted a similar power analysis to that in Chapter 4, but the correlation among
repeated measures was updated to .43 and the non-sphericity correction ε was updated to
.720. These estimates were based on averages between Chapters 3 and 4. The power
analysis indicated that given a total sample size of 156 and a medium effect size of f =
.25, the likelihood of detecting a significant interaction was over 99%.15

5.2.2

Materials

The same study lists and recognition items used in Chapters 3 and 4 were used in the
current Chapter.

5.2.3

Procedure

A similar procedure as Chapter 4 was employed with the main difference being the
recognition test. Rather than first making an old/new judgment and then, if the response
was deemed “old,” making a remember/know/guess judgment (two-step procedure), the
participant was instructed that if they thought the item was old, to press either
“remember,” “know,” or “guess” directly, depending on their type of memory for the lure
(one-step procedure). In other words, there was no preceding old/new judgment. If the
participant thought the item was new, they were instructed to not press anything and wait
for the next item to appear (as done by Knott and Dewhurst, 2007). Each recognition item
was displayed for 5 seconds following a 500ms fixation cross. The time limit was
imposed so that the participants under divided attention at test conditions could not
compensate for the concurrent task by looking at the item for a very long time, which
could allow for conscious processing. However, to maintain consistency, the one-step,
timed recognition test was applied to all conditions.

15

The sample size was reduced to a more conservative total of 156 because the power analysis
assumes equal N’s in all groups.
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There were two between-subjects conditions: attention at study (full vs. divided) and
attention at test (full vs. divided). The resulting four combinations are shown in Table
5.1. Note that Group 1 is a replication of the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3,
whereas Group 2 is a replication of the study described in Chapter 4. The same RNG task
as Chapter 4 was employed for dividing attention and participants were randomly
assigned to conditions.
Table 5.1. Design for Chapter 5 study with divided attention at study and test. Note:
Number of participants refers to the number retained in the analyses.
Concurrent task at Study Concurrent task at Test Number of Participants
Group 1
No
No
39
Group 2
Yes
No
39
Group 3
No
Yes
40
Group 4
Yes
Yes
40
The final recognition test was divided into six blocks of 18 items each to allow
participants a short break in between blocks. The same 107 items used in Chapters 3 and
4 were employed with the addition of one filler item (“the surprise was a hawk’s cry”)
taken from Cardillo, Schmidt, Kranjec, and Chatterjee (2010) so that each block included
exactly 18 items (the filler item will not be analysed). The 18 items for each block were
drawn randomly from the pool of 108 items.

5.3
5.3.1

Results
Preliminary analyses

Similar preliminary analyses as conducted in Chapter 4 were conducted for baseline false
recognition and correct vs. false recognition. On the initial recognition tests, one
participant in the full attention condition identified every item as old and one participant
from the divided attention at study condition identified all items but one (64 of 65) as old.
These two participants were removed from all subsequent analyses.
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5.3.1.1
5.3.1.1.1

Baseline false recognition
Initial recognition tests

The proportion of false recognition for the four lure types when unrelated to the study list
by condition are presented in Table 5.2 (see Appendix I for full breakdown of remember,
know, and guess judgments).
Table 5.2. Proportion of false recognition for unrelated lures by lure type and attention
conditions for the initial recognition tests.
Study condition
Test condition
Lure type
Old
Full attention
Full attention
Crit CM
.18(.39)
Crit consistent
.18(.27)
Cont metaphor
.09(.19)
Cont literal
.06(.20)
Total
.13(.18)
Divided attention
Crit CM
.08(.27)
Crit consistent
.15(.26)
Cont metaphor
.10(.20)
Cont literal
.08(.21)
Total
.10(.16)
Divided attention
Full attention
Crit CM
.15(.37)
Crit consistent
.32(.35)
Cont metaphor
.32(.39)
Cont literal
.17(.26)
Total
.24(.20)
Divided attention
Crit CM
.25(.44)
Crit consistent
.33(.33)
Cont metaphor
.35(.36)
Cont literal
.24(.34)
Total
.29(.25)
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 4 (lure
type) ANOVA with attention at study and attention at test as between-subjects factors
and lure type as a within-subjects factor revealed a significant main effect of lure type,
F(2.77, 426.80) = 4.93, p = .003, ηₚ² = .03. There was also a significant main effect of
attention at study, F(1, 154) = 22.48, p < .001, ηₚ² = .13, as false recognition was higher
when attention was divided at study vs. full (.27 vs. .11, respectively). The interaction
between divided attention at study and lure type was not reliable, F(2.77, 426.80) = 2.46,
p = .067, ηₚ² = .02, and none of the other main effects nor interactions approached
significance, all F’s < 1.6, p’s > .2. Least significant difference posthoc tests comparing
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the lure types collapsed across attention conditions revealed that the proportion of false
recognition for both the critical consistent (.24) and control metaphor (.22) lures was
significantly higher than for the control literal lures (.14), both p’s < .01. Also, the critical
consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the critical CM lures (p = .029).
This was likely because the critical consistent lures and control metaphor lures, like the
study lists, consist of metaphorical expressions, whereas the control literal lures are literal
sentences, and thus, are a different category of language from the study lists.
Nonetheless, this limits the strength of any conclusions made by directly comparing these
lure types in the main false recognition analyses. For this reason, comparisons will also
be conducted on the adjusted false recognition scores for the critical consistent and
control literal lures using the “high-threshold correction procedure,” as employed by
Gallo and Roediger (2002), Gallo, Roediger, and McDermott (2001), Schacter,
Verfaellie, and Pradere (1996), and Seamon, Luo, and Gallo (1998; see also Gallo, 2006,
p. 31-32). The procedure is described in Appendix K.

5.3.1.1.2

Final recognition test

The proportion of false recognition for the four unrelated lure types for the final
recognition test is displayed in Table 5.3 (see Appendix J for a full breakdown of
remember, know, and guess judgments for the unrelated lures).
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Table 5.3. Proportion of false recognition for unrelated lures by lure type, repetition
(previously tested or untested), and attention conditions for the final recognition test in
Chapter 5.
Previously Attention Attention Lure Type
Old
tested
at study
at test
Yes
Full
Full
Crit CM
.49(.51)
Crit consistent
.38(.42)
Cont metaphor
.33(.42)
Cont literal
.36(.40)
Total
.39(.33)
Divided
Crit CM
.38(.49)
Crit consistent
.35(.38)
Cont metaphor
.36(.36)
Cont literal
.25(.36)
Total
.33(.27)
Divided Full
Crit CM
.54(.51)
Crit consistent
.58(.34)
Cont metaphor
.50(.38)
Cont literal
.33(.37)
Total
.49(.27)
Divided
Crit CM
.53(.51)
Crit consistent
.45(.39)
Cont metaphor
.46(.43)
Cont literal
.45(.39)
Total
.47(.31)
No
Full
Full
Crit consistent
.05(.22)
Cont metaphor
.10(.31)
Cont literal
.08(.22)
Total
.08(.20)
Divided
Crit consistent
.20(.41)
Cont metaphor
.08(.27)
Cont literal
.10(.26)
Total
.13(.19)
Divided Full
Crit consistent
.15(.37)
Cont metaphor
.28(.46)
Cont literal
.13(.30)
Total
.19(.26)
Divided
Crit consistent
.25(.44)
Cont metaphor
.30(.46)
Cont literal
.19(.33)
Total
.25(.31)
As there were no observations for non-repeated (not previously tested) unrelated critical
CM lures, separate ANOVAs were conducted for the repeated and non-repeated lures. A
2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 4 (lure type)

83

ANOVA conducted on the previously tested lures revealed significant main effects of
both lure type, F(2.61, 401.53) = 4.24, p = .008, ηₚ² = .03, and attention at study, F(1,
154) = 6.17, p = .014, ηₚ² = .04, the latter of which was driven by a higher overall
proportion of false recognition for divided attention (.48) than full attention (.36). None
of the other main effects nor interactions reached significance, all F’s < 1.9, p’s > .1.
The main effect for lure type was examined further. Least significance difference posthoc
tests revealed that both the critical consistent (.44) and critical CM lures (.48) had a
significantly higher proportion of false recognition than the control literal lures (.35),
both p’s < .01. As such, adjusted false recognition proportions will also be compared for
these lure types in the main analyses.
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 3 (lure
type) ANOVA on the non-repeated lures revealed a significant main effect of attention at
study, F(1, 154) = 8.78, p = .004, ηₚ² = .05, as the proportion of false recognition was
higher for divided attention (.22) than full attention (.10). None of the other main effects
nor interactions were reliable, all F’s < 2.5, p’s > .05, and critically, there was no
significant main effect of lure type, F(1.87, 288.01) = 1.99, p = .142. Therefore, the nonrepeated lures can be compared directly in the main false recognition analyses without
requiring adjusted proportions.

5.3.1.2
5.3.1.2.1

Correct vs. false recognition
Initial recognition tests

The proportion of correct recognition and false alarms for unrelated lures by attention
conditions are displayed in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4. Proportion of items categorized as old for both presented items (correct
recognitions) and unrelated lures (false alarms) by attention at study and test.
Item Type
Study attention
Test attention
Proportion
categorized as Old
Presented
Full
Full
.87(.09)
Divided
.77(.14)
Divided
Full
.69(.12)
Divided
.74(.12)
Unrelated
Full
Full
.12(.16)
Divided
.10(.16)
Divided
Full
.25(.20)
Divided
.30(.25)
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 2 (item
type: presented vs. unrelated lure) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of item
type, F(1, 154) = 1052.60, p < .001, ηₚ² = .87, as, unsurprisingly, presented items were
more often categorized as old than unrelated lures (.77 vs. .19, respectively). More
critically, there was a significant interaction between attention at study and item type,
F(1, 154) = 57.57, p < .001, ηₚ² = .27, as dividing attention decreased correct recognition
(.82 vs. .71) but increased false alarms (.11 vs. .28). This indicates that dividing attention
at study has a strong negative influence on recognition performance. The only other
interaction that reached significance was the interaction between attention at study and
attention at test, F(1, 154) = 8.25, p = .005, ηₚ² = .05. This interaction suggests that when
there was a match between study and test in terms of attention (e.g., full-full or divideddivided), participants were more likely to categorize items as old, regardless of item type,
than when there was a mismatch (e.g., full-divided or divided-full). None of the other
interactions reached significance, which suggests that unlike dividing attention at study,
dividing attention at test did not have detrimental effects on recognition performance in
this task.
The percentage of correct recognitions attributed remember, know, and guess judgments
by attention conditions is displayed in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess responses within
correctly recognized items for the initial recognition tests of Chapter 5. Percentages are
presented by attention conditions at study and test.
Attention at study Attention at test
%R
%K
%G
Full
Full
66%
22%
12%
Divided
77%
15%
8%
Total
71%
19%
10%
Divided
Full
39%
32%
29%
Divided
50%
28%
22%
Total
45%
30%
25%
Total
Full
54%
27%
19%
Divided
64%
21%
15%
Total
59%
24%
17%
Separate 2 (attention: divided vs. full) x 3 (remember, know, or guess) chi-square tests
were conducted to examine the effects of dividing attention at study (collapsed across
attention at test) and dividing attention at test (collapsed across attention at study). Both
chi-square tests were significant, ꭓ²(2)’s > 41, p’s < .001, and in both cases, all six cells
deviated significantly from expected values (all z’s > 3.8, p’s < .001). Dividing attention
at study significantly decreased the percentage of remember judgments but increased the
percentage of know and guess judgments. In contrast, divided attention at test
significantly increased the percentage of remember judgments and decreased the
percentage of know and guess judgments. These findings will be considered further in the
Discussion.

5.3.1.2.2

Final recognition test

The proportion of items categorized as old for presented items (correct recognition) and
unrelated lures (false alarms) on the final recognition test are displayed in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6. Proportion of items categorized as old for both presented items (correct
recognition) and unrelated lures (false alarms) for the final recognition test in Chapter 5.
Proportions are presented by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), and attention
conditions (full vs. divided) at study and test.
Item type
Repeated Study attention Test attention Proportion categorized as old
Presented
Yes
Full
Full
.81(.19)
Divided
.76(.13)
Divided
Full
.68(.15)
Divided
.70(.16)
No
Full
Full
.65(.20)
Divided
.64(.18)
Divided
Full
.41(.20)
Divided
.51(.21)
Unrelated lure
Yes
Full
Full
.38(.33)
Divided
.33(.26)
Divided
Full
.48(.27)
Divided
.46(.30)
No
Full
Full
.08(.20)
Divided
.12(.19)
Divided
Full
.17(.25)
Divided
.23(.30)
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 2
(repeated: yes vs. no) x 2 (item type: presented vs. unrelated lure) ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of item type, F(1, 154) = 434.63, p < .001, ηₚ² = .74, as the
presented items were more often categorized as “old” than the unrelated lures (.65 vs. .28,
respectively). There was also a significant main effect of repetition, F(1, 154) = 260.72, p
< .001, ηₚ² = .63, as previously tested items were more likely to be categorized as “old”
than previously untested items (.57 vs. .35, respectively). There was a significant
interaction between attention at study and item type, F(1, 154) = 52.58, p < .001, ηₚ² =
.25. Dividing attention decreased correct recognition of presented items (full: .72;
divided: .57) but increased false alarms for unrelated lures (full: .23; divided: .34). There
was also a significant interaction between attention at test and repetition, F(1, 154) =
6.72, p = .010, ηₚ² = .04. Dividing attention at test decreased the proportion of repeated
items categorized as old (.59 vs .56) but increased the proportion of non-repeated items
categorized as old (.33 vs. .38). Finally, there was an interaction between item type and
repetition, F(1, 154) = 13.27, p < .001, ηₚ² = .08. Repetition caused a greater increase in
the proportion of items categorized as old for unrelated lures (.15 vs. .41; a .26 increase)
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than for presented items (.55 vs. .74, a .18 increase [some discrepancy due to rounding]).
None of the other main effects, nor interactions reached significance, all F’s < 3.5, p’s >
.05.

5.3.1.2.3

Phenomenological experience of correct recognition
for final recognition test

The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions by
attention conditions for the final recognition test are displayed in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess responses within
correctly recognized items for the final recognition test in Chapter 5. Percentages are
presented by attention conditions at study and test.
Attention at study Attention at test
%R
%K
%G
Full
Full
59%
24%
17%
Divided
67%
20%
13%
Total
63%
22%
15%
Divided
Full
30%
33%
38%
Divided
41%
30%
29%
Total
36%
31%
33%
Total
Full
46%
28%
26%
Divided
55%
25%
20%
Total
51%
26%
23%
Similar chi-square tests as conducted for the initial recognition tests revealed significant
effects of attention at both study and test, both ꭓ²(2)’s > 47, p’s < .001. At study, divided
attention significantly decreased the percentage of remember judgments and increased the
percentage of know and guess judgments (all z’s > 8.0, p’s < .001). At test, divided
attention significantly increased the percentage of remember judgments and decreased the
percentage of guess judgments (z’s > 5.4, p’s < .001).

5.3.2
5.3.2.1

Main analysis
Initial recognition tests

The proportion of false recognition, as well as proportions remembered, known, and
guessed, for the five different lure types by attention conditions is displayed in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.8. Proportion of false recognition and remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G)
judgments for the initial recognition tests in Chapter 5. Proportions are presented by
attention conditions (full vs. divided) at study and test and by lure type.
Attention
Attention Item type
Old
R
K
G
at study
at test
Full
Full
Crit CM
.22(.34)
.06(.20) .04(.13) .12(.27)
Crit consistent
.29(.24)
.06(.12) .11(.13) .13(.15)
Cont metaphor
.18(.22)
.04(.08) .03(.08) .11(.15)
Cont literal
.18(.20)
.04(.09) .03(.06) .11(.13)
Unrelated
.12(.16)
.02(.05) .04(.10) .07(.10)
Total
.20(.19)
.04(.08) .05(.06) .11(.12)
Divided
Crit CM
.35(.36)
.14(.28) .10(.20) .11(.21)
Crit consistent
.33(.23)
.14(.17) .09(.13) .10(.15)
Cont metaphor
.20(.20)
.09(.14) .03(.07) .08(.10)
Cont literal
.16(.19)
.07(.12) .03(.07) .07(.10)
Unrelated
.10(.16)
.06(.14) .02(.05) .03(.05)
Total
.23(.16)
.10(.12) .05(.07) .08(.08)
Divided
Full
Crit CM
.36(.36)
.05(.15) .18(.29) .13(.25)
Crit consistent
.54(.22)
.09(.13) .16(.15) .29(.16)
Cont metaphor
.38(.24)
.07(.12) .13(.15) .18(.16)
Cont literal
.36(.26)
.03(.06) .17(.20) .15(.15)
Unrelated
.25(.20)
.02(.06) .09(.12) .14(.13)
Total
.38(.19)
.05(.07) .15(.13) .18(.11)
Divided
Crit CM
.44(.38)
.16(.26) .16(.26) .11(.21)
Crit consistent
.52(.26)
.17(.18) .18(.18) .18(.14)
Cont metaphor
.43(.25)
.14(.17) .14(.15) .15(.16)
Cont literal
.36(.24)
.09(.14) .10(.13) .17(.17)
Unrelated
.30(.25)
.04(.09) .11(.14) .14(.14)
Total
.41(.20)
.12(.13) .14(.12) .15(.09)
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) by 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 5 (lure
type) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of lure type, F(2.76, 424.45) = 30.55, p <
.001, ηₚ² = .17, and attention at study, F(1, 154) = 35.15, p < .001, ηₚ² = .19, the latter of
which was driven by a higher proportion of false recognition overall when, relative to full
attention, attention was divided (.39 vs. .21 respectively). None of the other main effects
or interactions reached significance (all F’s < 2.1, p’s > .1). Critically, the lack of
significant interactions suggests that attention, either at study or test, did not influence the
pattern of false recognition.
Planned t-test comparisons were conducted within each of the four combinations of
attention (full-full, full-divided, divided-full, and divided-divided) to compare false
recognition proportions for the critical lures against the control lures (alpha = .025). In all
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four combinations, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than
the three control lures, all t’s > 2.3, p’s < .025. In contrast, the critical CM lures only
differed from the three controls when attention was full at study but divided at test, all
t(39)’s > 2.6, p’s < .02. In all other combinations, the critical CM lures did not differ
significantly from either the control metaphor or literal lures (t’s < 2.3, p’s > .025). In
summary, the conceptual metaphor false memory effect replicated under both divided and
full attention conditions for the critical consistent lures.

5.3.2.1.1

Adjusted comparisons

Because the critical consistent and control literal lures differed in baseline false
recognition, these two lure types were compared using adjusted false recognition values
(see Appendix K for more details). A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention
at test: full vs. divided) x 2 (lure type: critical consistent vs. control literal) ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of lure type, F(1, 154) = 6.40, p = .012, ηₚ² = .04, as the
critical consistent lures had a higher proportion of false recognition than the control
literal lures even after adjustments (.18 vs. .13 respectively). There was also a significant
main effect of attention at study, F(1, 154) = 40.24, p < .001, ηₚ² = .21, as the proportion
of false recognition was significantly higher under divided attention (.25) than full
attention (.05). None of the other main effects nor interactions reached significance, all
F’s < 1.2, p’s > .2.
Simple t-tests were conducted to examine whether the critical consistent lures were
falsely recognized more often than the control literal lures in each of the four attention
combinations after adjustments. The difference did not reach significance in any of the
individual combinations, all t’s < 1.8, p’s > .05. Therefore, the difference between the
critical consistent lures and control literal lures was only significant when examining
across all four conditions, but the difference was not robust within any single condition
on its own.
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5.3.2.1.2

Phenomenological experience of false recognition

The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions of
actual old items and false recognitions of lures by attention conditions are displayed in
Table 5.9.
Table 5.9. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within
correct or false recognitions for the initial recognition tests in Chapter 5. Percentages are
presented by attention conditions (full vs. divided) at study and test and by item type.
Attention Attention Item Type
%R
%K
%G
at Study
at Test
Full
Full
Old
66%
22%
12%

Divided

Divided

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old

29%
20%
21%
25%
15%
21%
77%

18%
37%
18%
18%
30%
26%
15%

53%
43%
61%
58%
55%
53%
8%

Full

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old

39%
43%
44%
42%
59%
44%
39%

29%
26%
17%
17%
17%
22%
32%

32%
31%
39%
40%
24%
34%
29%

Divided

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old

14%
16%
19%
9%
7%
14%
50%

50%
29%
33%
48%
36%
37%
28%

36%
54%
48%
43%
57%
49%
22%

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition

37%
33%
32%
26%
13%
28%

37%
34%
32%
28%
39%
33%

26%
34%
35%
46%
48%
38%
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Separate 3 (remember, know, or guess) x 5 (lure type) chi-square tests were conducted
within each of the attention combinations (alpha = .0125 for four tests). None of the chisquare tests reached significance [all ꭓ²(8)’s < 20.0, p’s > .0125].
Separate 2 (correct vs. overall false recognition) by 3 (remember, know, or guess) chisquare tests were also conducted within the four attention combinations to compare
correct and false recognition. All four tests were significant, ꭓ²(2)’s > 75.0, p’s < .001. In
all combinations, false recognitions were attributed a higher percentage of guess
responses and a lower percentage of remember responses than correct recognitions (all
z’s > 6.8, p’s < .001). Additionally, in the divided attention at test only condition, false
recognitions were attributed a higher percentage of know responses than correct
recognitions, but the difference was only marginally significant, z’s = 2.64, p’s = .008
(alpha = .008 for six cells). In the other three attention combinations, the know cells did
not deviate significantly from expected values, all z’s < 2.2, p’s > .03.

5.3.2.2

Final recognition test

The proportion of false recognition for the five lure types by attention conditions and
repetition (previously tested vs. untested) is displayed in Table 5.10.
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Table 5.10. Proportion of false recognition and remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G)
judgments for the final recognition test in Chapter 5. Proportions are presented by
repetition (previously tested vs. untested), attention conditions (full vs. divided) at study
and test, and lure type.
Previously Attention Attention Lure Type
Old
R
K
G
tested
at study
at test
Yes
Full
Full
Crit CM
.47(.41) .23(.38) .14(.26) .10(.26)
Crit consistent .61(.28) .25(.29) .16(.18) .19(.17)
Cont metaphor .45(.32) .20(.27) .14(.15) .11(.11)
Cont literal
.36(.31) .13(.23) .11(.17) .12(.18)
Unrelated
.38(.33) .13(.23) .12(.17) .12(.15)
Total
.45(.28) .19(.25) .13(.13) .13(.13)
Divided Crit CM
.64(.34) .30(.41) .19(.31) .15(.23)
Crit consistent .60(.25) .28(.25) .13(.14) .18(.19)
Cont metaphor .42(.22) .22(.20) .10(.14) .10(.13)
Cont literal
.29(.26) .14(.22) .05(.09) .10(.15)
Unrelated
.33(.26) .12(.19) .08(.14) .13(.15)
Total
.46(.18) .21(.20) .11(.10) .13(.11)
Divided Full
Crit CM
.54(.42) .10(.23) .23(.32) .21(.34)
Crit consistent .73(.20) .13(.18) .31(.25) .29(.22)
Cont metaphor .58(.23) .14(.18) .20(.18) .24(.18)
Cont literal
.47(.23) .08(.14) .16(.16) .24(.17)
Unrelated
.48(.27) .11(.18) .13(.14) .23(.20)
Total
.56(.19) .11(.14) .21(.14) .24(.13)
Divided Crit CM
.73(.28) .24(.32) .23(.30) .26(.34)
Crit consistent .69(.23) .25(.22) .22(.19) .22(.23)
Cont metaphor .64(.21) .21(.20) .22(.14) .22(.18)
Cont literal
.50(.27) .13(.16) .16(.17) .20(.18)
Unrelated
.46(.30) .14(.20) .11(.14) .21(.21)
Total
.60(.18) .19(.18) .19(.11) .22(.16)
No
Full
Full
Crit CM
.27(.38) .05(.15) .04(.13) .18(.31)
Crit consistent .26(.26) .06(.13) .06(.12) .13(.21)
Cont metaphor .17(.24) .03(.10) .03(.08) .12(.18)
Cont literal
.08(.16) .01(.05) .00(.02) .07(.15)
Unrelated
.08(.20) .03(.11) .00(.00) .05(.13)
Total
.17(.19) .03(.09) .03(.04) .11(.13)
Divided Crit CM
.30(.35) .15(.28) .00(.00) .15(.26)
Crit consistent .46(.29) .18(.27) .10(.18) .18(.24)
Cont metaphor .18(.23) .08(.20) .03(.08) .07(.13)
Cont literal
.11(.19) .07(.16) .02(.05) .03(.08)
Unrelated
.12(.19) .04(.11) .01(.04) .08(.14)
Total
.24(.17) .10(.16) .03(.05) .10(.10)
Divided Full
Crit CM
.33(.37) .08(.24) .14(.26) .12(.24)
Crit consistent .33(.25) .04(.10) .12(.18) .16(.21)
Cont metaphor .23(.25) .03(.08) .04(.11) .17(.21)
Cont literal
.16(.19) .01(.03) .04(.08) .11(.15)
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Divided

Unrelated
Total
Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total

.17(.25)
.24(.17)
.44(.40)
.42(.29)
.26(.27)
.23(.25)
.23(.30)
.32(.23)

.02(.07)
.03(.07)
.14(.28)
.13(.21)
.04(.15)
.05(.13)
.07(.20)
.08(.16)

.03(.08)
.08(.08)
.11(.21)
.09(.14)
.08(.18)
.07(.08)
.06(.14)
.08(.09)

.12(.22)
.13(.14)
.19(.27)
.21(.20)
.13(.22)
.12(.18)
.11(.20)
.15(.14)

A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 2
(repeated: yes vs. no) x 5 (lure type) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of
attention at study [F(1, 154) = 12.45, p < .001, ηₚ² = .07] and repetition [F(1, 154) =
371.69, p < .001, ηₚ² = .71] as false recognition was higher overall under divided
attention and for repeated lures. There was also a main effect of lure type, F(2.88,
443.97) = 72.05, p < .001, ηₚ² = .32, and a significant interaction between attention at test
and lure type, F(2.88, 443.97) = 3.67, p = .013, ηₚ² = .02. The interaction seemed to be
due to divided attention at test increasing false recognition for the critical CM lures (.40
to .53, a .12 increase [discrepancy due to rounding]) and the critical consistent lures (.48
to .54, a .6 increase) to a greater extent than for the control metaphor (.36 to .37, a .02
increase [discrepancy due to rounding]), control literal (.27 to .28, a .01 increase) and
unrelated lures (.28 to .29, a .01 increase). Simple t-tests comparing across test conditions
(and using the false recognition proportions averaged between repeated and non-repeated
items) revealed that this increase was only significant for the critical CM lures,
t(149.67)16 = 2.62, p = .01, but was not significant for any of the other types of lures, all
t’s < 1.9, p’s > .05. There was also a significant three-way interaction between study at
test, repetition, and lure type, F(2.81, 432.82) = 4.93, p = .003, ηₚ² = .03. This interaction
is more difficult to interpret, but it suggests that attention at test and repetition interacted
differently depending on the lure type.
Planned t-tests were conducted to compare each critical lure against the three control
lures within each of the combinations of attention and repetition (alpha = .025). In six of
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Levene’s test indicated unequal variances, F = 6.67, p = .011, therefore, the degrees of
freedom were adjusted.
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the eight combination, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized significantly
more often than all three controls (t’s > 3.7, p’s < .001). The two exceptions were that the
critical consistent lures did not differ significantly from the control metaphor lures for
repeated lures with divided attention at both study and test [t(39) = 1.03, p = .308] and for
non-repeated lures with full attention at both study and test [t(38) = 1.92, p = .062]. Even
in these cases, the differences were treading in the predicted direction and the critical
consistent lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than the other two
control lures (t’s > 4.6, p’s < .001). In contrast, the critical CM lures only differed
significantly from all three controls in two combinations: repeated lures with divided
attention at test only [t(39)’s > 3.9, p’s < .001] and non-repeated lures with divided
attention at study and test [t(39)’s > 2.9, p’s < .01]. In all other combinations, the critical
CM lures did not differ significantly from the control metaphor lures, t’s < 2.3, p’s > .03.

5.3.2.2.1

Adjusted comparisons

A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 2 (lure
type: critical consistent vs. control literal) ANOVA was conducted on the adjusted
proportions of false recognition for the repeated critical consistent and control metaphor
lures (see Appendix K for more detail about the adjustment procedure employed). There
was a significant main effect of attention at study, F(1, 154) = 14.42, p < .001, ηₚ² = .09,
as the overall proportion of false recognition was higher under divided attention (.20)
than under full attention conditions at study (.07). More critically, there was a significant
main effect of lure type, F(1, 154) = 55.31, p < .001, ηₚ² = .26, as the critical consistent
lures had a higher proportion of false recognition than the control literal lures even after
adjustments (.22 vs. .06). None of the other main effects or interactions reached
significance, all F’s < 2.1, p’s > .15. In all four combinations of attention, the critical
consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the control literal lures, all t’s >
2.4, p’s < .025.
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5.3.2.2.2

Phenomenological experience of false recognition

The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions of
actual old items and false recognitions of lures for the final recognition test are displayed
in Table 5.11.
Table 5.11. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within
correct or false recognitions for the final recognition test in Chapter 5. Percentages are
presented by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), attention conditions (full vs.
divided) at study and test, and item type.
Previously Attention Attention Item type
%R
%K
%G
tested
at study
at test
Yes
Full
Full
Old (actual presented)
64%* 21%* 15%*

Divided

No

Full

Divided

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

49%
30%
22%
41%
27%
32%
44%
31%
25%
37%
30%
33%
35%
32%
33%
40%* 30%* 30%*
69%* 19% 12%*

Full

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

47%
47%
53%
48%
36%
47%*
32%*

29%
22%
23%
17%
25%
23%
34%

24%
31%
24%
35%
39%
31%*
34%*

Divided

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

19%
18%
24%
16%
24%
20%*
44%*

43%
43%
34%
34%
27%
36%
30%

38%
40%
42%
50%
49%
44%*
26%*

Full

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

33%
31%
36%
36%
32%
32%
33%
33%
34%
26%
33%
41%
31%
24%
45%
32%* 31% 37%*
50%* 29%* 22%*
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Divided

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

19%
14%
67%
23%
25%
53%
15%
15%
70%
15%
4%
81%
33%
0%
67%
20%* 14%* 66%*
64%* 23% 13%*

Full

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

50%
39%
45%
61%
32%
45%*
23%*

0%
22%
17%
14%
5%
15%
28%

50%
39%
38%
25%
63%
40%*
49%

Divided

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Cont metaphor
Cont literal
Unrelated
Total false recognition
Old (actual presented)

23%
14%
11%
4%
11%
12%*
34%

42%
37%
17%
28%
19%
29%
32%

35%
49%
72%
68%
70%
59%
34%*

Crit CM
31%
Crit consistent
30%
Cont metaphor
17%
Cont literal
20%
Unrelated
30%
Total false recognition
25%
*Percentage deviates significantly from expected value (p < .008).

26%
21%
32%
30%
24%
26%

43%
49%
51%
50%
46%
48%*

Divided

Separate 3 (remember, know, or guess) x 5 (lure type) chi-square tests were conducted
within each of the eight combinations of attention at study, attention at test, and repetition
(alpha = .006 for eight tests). None of the chi-square tests reached significance, all ꭓ²(8) <
17.2, p’s > .02.
Separate 2 (correct vs. false recognition) x 3 (remember, know, or guess) chi-square tests
were also conducted within the different combinations (alpha = .006). In all eight cases,
the chi-square test was significant, all ꭓ²(2)’s > 11.0, p’s < .005. The cells that deviated
significantly from expected values in the posthoc analyses (alpha = .008) are marked with
a ‘*’ in Table 5.14 above.
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Within repeated items, a consistent pattern emerged across all combinations: false
recognitions were attributed a significantly higher percentage of guess responses and a
significantly lower percentage of remember responses (z’s > 4.1, p’s < .001). Within
repeated items under full attention at both test and study, false recognitions were also
attributed a significantly higher percentage of know responses than was observed for
correct recognitions, z’s = 3.80, p’s < .001.
For non-repeated items, a different pattern emerged for each attention combination.
When attention was full at study and test, false recognitions were attributed a
significantly higher percentage of guess responses and a significantly lower percentage of
both remember and know responses than correct recognitions, z’s > 3.3, p’s < 001.
Within the divided attention at test only condition, false recognitions were attributed a
significantly higher percentage of guess responses and a significantly lower percentage of
remember responses than correct recognitions, z’s > 4.5, p’s < .001. Within the divided
attention at study only condition, false recognitions were attributed a significantly lower
percentage of remember responses than correct recognitions, z’s = 3.23, p = .001. Finally,
for divided attention at both study and test, false recognitions were attributed a
significantly higher percentage of guess responses than correct recognitions, z’s = 3.57,
p’s < .001.

5.4

Discussion

The purpose of Chapter 5 was to replicate the findings from the previous chapters and
also extend the study to determine if dividing attention at test would eliminate the
conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Interpretation of the results was more
complicated than in the previous chapters because there were differences in the
proportion of false recognition for the lure types at baseline, that is, when the lures were
unrelated to the study lists. Nonetheless, even after making adjustments, across the entire
study there was still evidence of a conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Importantly,
the effect was not eliminated by dividing attention at either study or test. On the initial
recognition tests, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the
control metaphor lures and unrelated lures in all attention conditions, and were falsely
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recognized more often than the control literal lures over the whole experiment, even after
adjusting for the difference between these lures in baseline false recognition.
On the other hand, after adjusting for the difference in baseline false recognition between
the critical consistent and control literal lures, the difference in false recognition did not
reach significance in any of the four attention conditions (full-full, full-divided, dividedfull, and divided-divided) on their own, but only when all four conditions were analysed
together. However, each of these conditions alone was only a quarter of the data, which
reduces the statistical power substantially. Critically, there were no interactions with
attention at either study or test, which suggests that dividing attention did not attenuate
the conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Therefore, taken together, this study
provides further evidence that conceptual metaphors activate and influence memory
automatically, both at encoding (study) and retrieval (test).
On the final recognition test, across all combinations of repetition and attention the
critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the control literal lures
(even after adjustments) and the unrelated lures. In 6 of the 8 combinations, the critical
consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the control metaphor lures, and
only for repeated lures with divided attention at both test and study, and for non-repeated
lures with full attention at test and study did the contrasts not reach significance (and
even in these cases, the differences were trending in the predicted direction). There was
an interaction between attention at test and lure type on the final recognition test, due to
an increase in false recognition for the critical CM lures when attention was divided.
Arguably, this last finding is due to divided attention hindering participants’ ability to
reject these lures based on their surface form. These lures use an “A is B” format and
contain fewer words on average than the study list items which may be cues to reject
these items as “old”. Dividing attention may hinder participants’ ability to use these cues,
leading to higher levels of false recognition. Importantly, there was no evidence that
dividing attention at test diminished the conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Taken
together, this chapter further replicates the conceptual metaphor false memory effect and
provides additional evidence that the effect does not depend on conscious, strategic
processing at either encoding or retrieval.
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5.4.1

Phenomenological experience of recognition

Overall, there was no consistent pattern for the “remember, know, and guess”
percentages within false recognitions for the different lure types. Therefore, it seems that
when the lures actually are falsely recognized, there is no special status for the critical
consistent lures in the R/K/G percentages. For instance, these lures do not have a higher
percentage of recollection (R) or familiarity (K) than the falsely recognized lures from
the other lure types. The R/K/G judgments were included as exploratory since CMT
makes no predictions on whether conceptual metaphor activation should primarily
influence recollection or familiarity. That being said, the critical consistent lures always
have less “remember” judgments than they do combined “know” and “guess” judgments.
This suggests that most of the time the lures induce feelings of familiarity, rather than a
quasi-sensory experience of recollection. This finding is consistent with both processing
fluency (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) and fuzzy-trace theory explanations (Brainerd &
Reyna, 2005) of false memory as both theories suggest that false memories are based
primarily on familiarity. Furthermore, familiarity is thought to be more automatic
whereas recollection is thought to involve more effortful processing (Yonelinas, 2002).
Therefore, the high rates of familiarity indicated by “know” and “guess” responses
further support the automatic activation of conceptual metaphors, albeit indirectly.
One additional finding for correctly recognized items was that the percentage of
“remember” judgments decreased when attention was divided at study but increased
when attention was divided at test. Although seemingly contradictory, Knott and
Dewhurst (2007) obtained similar findings. They suggest that at test, “remember”
judgments can be made rapidly whereas “know” judgments require postretrieval
decisions that are disrupted by divided attention. Arguably, the same might be happening
with the processing of the metaphor lists.
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Chapter 6

6

General discussion

The purpose of this thesis was to empirically investigate the psychological reality of
conceptual metaphors by testing whether reading a list of expressions based on a
presumed conceptual metaphor would activate other non-presented expressions of that
metaphor. Across all four experiments, it was found that this was the case: participants
consistently falsely recognized metaphorically related expressions more often than
topically related control expressions. The control lures were related in terms of either the
target domain (control metaphor) or source domain (control literal) and were about
equally related to the study list expressions in terms of word-based similarity. The
findings are thus completely consistent with the argument that the conceptual metaphor
false memory effect depends upon the expression using the same source-to-target
metaphor mapping. More generally, the findings support the claim (Gibbs, 1996, 2011,
2013) that conceptual metaphors are indeed psychologically real and influence cognition.
The secondary purpose was to examine another controversial question: Do conceptual
metaphors influence memory automatically and unconsciously? This was examined here
using both direct and indirect measures and converging evidence indicates that
conceptual metaphor activation is automatic. In Chapter 3, although participants rarely
reported consciously attending to source-to-target metaphor mappings, the results from
the recognition tests clearly replicated the conceptual metaphor false memory effect
found in Reid & Katz (2018a). Furthermore, in Chapters 4 and 5, dividing attention did
not diminish the conceptual metaphor false memory effect. These results taken together
strongly suggest that conceptual metaphor activation is automatic and unconscious. This
is consistent with the original CMT (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993) and is also
consistent with the finding from Katz and Law (2010) that giving participants hints about
the metaphorical nature of the to-be-remembered expressions (and thus, bringing
conscious attention to the metaphor mappings) did not increase memory performance, but
in fact, hindered performance.
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In general, the findings from the current set of studies align with previous research that
strongly suggests the traditional word-based DRM false memory effect is automatic.
Along with findings that the effect still occurs under divided attention (Knott &
Dewhurst, 2007; Pimentel & Albuquerque, 2013), it also occurs when participants are
warned that the purpose of the study is to induce a false memory (Gallo, Roberts, &
Seamon, 1997; Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 2001; McDermott & Roediger, 1998;
Multhaup & Conner, 2002) and when study list words are presented rapidly (20ms;
Seamon, Luo, & Gallo, 1998; Kawasaki & Yama, 2006) such that the participant is not
consciously aware of the words being presented. These findings suggest that false
memories for critical lures in the DRM paradigm occur automatically and unconsciously,
and that participants have difficulty resisting the memory illusion even when they are
expecting it, at least with word list stimuli. The findings presented in this thesis indicating
that the conceptual metaphor false memory effect occurs automatically and not
consciously thus align nicely with the body of research examining the DRM effect.

6.1

Implications for DRM research

Most of the previous research on the DRM paradigm has focused on lists of words. The
current study extends the DRM paradigm to full sentences, and furthermore, complex
sentences involving figurative language. An analogous memory illusion was found by
Bransford and Franks (1971) in which non-presented sentences were falsely recognized if
they contained highly similar semantic content to the presented sentence. In that study,
however, the sentence lures were much more obviously related and shared many of the
same words. In the current study, the sentence lures were less related, not sharing as
much overlap in terms of words, and the sentences were not all referring to the same
event or occurrence. However, the sentences were related in terms of a deeper underlying
meaning, in this case sharing a common cross-domain metaphorical mapping. Therefore,
this finding extends previous research on false recognition for sentences by suggesting
that even when sentences are fairly unrelated on the surface, they can still induce false
recognition if they are based on the same metaphorical mapping.
Although the goal of this thesis was not to test alternative false memory theories, I
speculate on how three major theories, automatic spreading activation, processing

102

fluency, and fuzzy-trace theory, could accommodate the findings. Following this, I
consider the findings from the “remember,” “know,” and “guess” judgments and how
they may relate to CMT and DMT.

6.1.1

Automatic Spreading Activation

Roediger, Balota, and Watson (2001) suggest that the DRM effect is due to automatic
associative activation and mainly focus on word-based similarity or associations, but in
the current study, word-based similarity cannot fully account for the results. In fact, the
critical and control lures did not differ significantly in terms of word similarity to their
respective study lists, at least as measured in terms of a vector-based word model, which
should tap into both similarity and association (Clark, 2015; Reid & Katz, 2018b).
Therefore, it seems that false memory in the DRM paradigm can be elicited by factors
beyond word similarity. In this case, it was elicited by metaphorical similarity.
Automatic spreading activation could accommodate the current findings if metaphorical
expressions are stored in semantic memory somewhat like words (e.g., Swinney &
Cutler, 1979; see Nayak & Gibbs, 1990, for a review of these accounts). Similar to how
nodes for related words are connected, nodes for expressions might also be connected
when they are based on the same underlying conceptual metaphor. That is, expressions
that use the same cross-domain mapping are likely stored in the same semantic memory
structure, or at least these expressions are in closer proximity than expressions using
different cross-domain mappings. By this account, activation could possibly spread
between nodes for expressions as it does with nodes for words. I repeat this is speculation
because expressions really have not been considered in the spreading activation literature,
especially regarding DRM false memory effects.

6.1.2

Processing Fluency

Processing fluency and spreading activation explanations of false memory go hand-inhand as spreading activation results in fluent processing of related lures (Gallo &
Roediger, 2003; Whittlesea, 2002). However, the critical difference is that processing
fluency does not depend on metaphorical expressions being stored in semantic memory.
Alternatively, conceptual metaphors may act more like schemas that help to organize and
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interpret metaphorical expressions and the schema may be activated when a metaphorical
expression is read. In other words, the expression itself is not retrieved from semantic
memory, but the conceptual metaphor schema is employed to make sense of the
expression. This would still lead to the same processing fluency advantage because if the
schema is already activated from reading prior expressions, new expressions should be
more readily processed.
A processing fluency explanation could be tested using the paradigm employed by
Whittlesea (2002), who had participants read DRM-type lists, but then make a lexical
decision on the critical lure rather than a recognition judgment. Applied to the current
study, participants would first read the study list expressions and then read related and
unrelated critical consistent lure sentences. A processing fluency explanation would
depend on the critical consistent lures being read faster when related to the study list than
when unrelated. Some previous research has found that reading metaphor expressions
based on the same conceptual metaphor facilitates processing of related expressions, but
the findings are mixed, and either way, facilitated processing has not been confirmed
with the stimuli employed in the current study.

6.1.3

Fuzzy-trace theory

Lastly, the conceptual metaphor false memory effect could be explained in terms of
fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Recall that this theory focuses on the
“gist,” or the deeper theme or meaning of the to-be-remembered information. From this
perspective, the “gist” of each study list would essentially be the underlying conceptual
metaphor, and the critical consistent lures would be consistent with the “gist” of each list.
Although some have argued that gist extraction likely relies on more effortful processing,
and therefore, more conscious awareness than a spreading activation explanation
(Carneiro, Garcia-Marques, Fernandez, & Albuquerque, 2014), Brainerd and colleagues
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian, & Reyna, 2006) do not make any
claims about whether gist extraction is conscious or unconscious. Therefore, a gist-based
explanation for the findings from this set of studies accommodates the data nicely.
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The purpose of this thesis was not to test alternative theories of false memory, but to test
assumptions of CMT, so I do not make strong claims regarding which memory theory
best supports the data. Overall, the three outlined theories all reasonably accommodate
the findings.

6.1.4

Remember, Know, and Guess Judgments

Across Chapters 3, 4, and 5 in which the remember-know-guess procedure was
employed, the results suggest that false recognitions of the critical consistent lures were
attributed mostly to familiarity. Over all these chapters, the falsely recognized critical
consistent lures never had a percentage of remember judgments above 50%, and the
percentage of guess judgments was fairly high across all experiments, suggesting a
weaker and less confident sense of familiarity (Hirshman, 1998). Although these data on
their own cannot be used to confidently distinguish between CMT and DMT, when
considered in light of the other findings from the strategy descriptions and divided
attention manipulations, they further suggest that conceptual metaphors are activated
automatically. Familiarity is considered to be the more unconscious and automatic type
of memory whereas recollection is considered more effortful and intentional. Given the
automaticity assumption of CMT, one would expect a greater degree of familiarity-based
false recognitions. This is also consistent with the notion that conceptual metaphor
activation facilitates processing of related expressions, as processing fluency primarily
affects familiarity. In contrast, one may expect more false recollection if cross-domain
mappings depend on conscious and deliberate processing, as proposed by DMT. I repeat
that this cannot carry the argument for CMT over DMT; however, given the entirety of
the data, the high percentage of false familiarity further supports the automaticity of
conceptual metaphor activation.
It should be noted that the low percentage of “remember” responses could also be due to
methodological factors unrelated to CMT and DMT. For instance, full sentences were
employed, and participants may have hesitated to use “remember” judgments if any
single word in the lure sentence seemed unfamiliar. Full sentences also require a longer
presentation duration (3 seconds) which is a factor known to weaken false recognition
effects (McDermott & Watson, 2001) and potentially resulted in less false “remember”
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judgments in the current study. At best, the “remember,” “know,” and “guess” judgments
should be interpreted cautiously, but the data is consistent with the original CMT.

6.2

Implications for CMT research

These experiments provide a novel way of testing CMT and have demonstrated that
conceptual metaphors play a role in episodic memory. As Murphy (1996) pointed out in
his critique rejecting the claim that CMT is a realistic theory of conceptual representation,
the influence of conceptual metaphors should be observable across the broad domains of
cognitive psychology, such as memory, problem solving, and categorization. He
rightfully pointed out that CMT research has not systematically explored these different
areas. The studies reported here have extended the study of CMT into one of the domains
proposed as important by Murphy, namely the implications of CMT on episodic memory
tasks.
To date, most of the cognitive (psychological) research on CMT falls under one of three
broad categories: embodiment of concepts, metaphorical framing, and online
comprehension. Each of these streams of research is valuable and has demonstrated
compelling effects of metaphor in thought, though as reviewed below, each has issues for
being a pure measure of the influence of conceptual metaphors on cognition.
In terms of embodiment, it is not unique to CMT. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005)
argue that abstract concepts can be embodied through direct experience rather than
metaphorical mappings, and Holyoak and Stamenković (2018) argue embodied effects
could be explained by polysemous words activating both physical embodied and abstract
senses of words simultaneously. Although embodiment has been a fundamental aspect of
CMT, some scholars have challenged the more rigid view that conceptual metaphors are
always concrete source-to-abstract target mappings. Ortony (1988) argued that for many
emotion metaphors (e.g., ANGER IS HEAT IN A CONTAINER, ANGER IS
INSANITY), children would have experience with the emotion before they would have
an understanding of the source domain that structures it. Source domains are presumed to
supply information from easier understood and directly experienced concepts, yet to
understand the various ANGER IS HEAT IN A CONTAINER metaphors (e.g., “he
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flipped his lid”), one would need to know at least some information about physics (see
also Murphy, 1996; Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008). However, it is unlikely that children’s
knowledge of physics would precede their knowledge of anger. Therefore, in this case it
seems that the target domain is the more easily understood and directly experienced
domain, especially early in life. Gibbs (2018) has also argued that CMT has neglected
abstract source-to-concrete target mappings, for instance, not only can JOURNEYS be
used to conceptualize LIFE, but LIFE can also be a metaphor for a JOURNEY.
Therefore, although many conceptual metaphors may help to conceptualize abstract
concepts by drawing on concrete experiences, it seems that this need not always be the
case; conceptual metaphors may simply draw information from another domain that in
some way helps to highlight or communicate certain aspects of the target domain
(Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008). As such, CMT research exploring the embodiment of
abstract concepts may not capture the full spectrum of how conceptual metaphors are
used in thought.
The stream of research on metaphorical framing has emphasized ecologically valid
experiments exploring how metaphors can influence reasoning about real-life issues, such
as crime (Steen, Reijnierse, & Burgers, 2014; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011, 2013),
marriage (Robins & Mayer, 2000), and global warming (Flusberg, Matlock, &
Thibodeau, 2017). It should be noted that this line of research is not primarily concerned
with testing the assumptions of CMT, but rather the focus is on the metaphorical framing
effect itself. However, metaphorical framing aligns nicely with CMT as the fundamental
assumption of CMT is that metaphors are a matter of thought, not just of language.
As a pure measure of the effect of conceptual metaphors on cognition, metaphorical
framing has some issues. For instance, the metaphorical framing effect disappears when
the participant is already an expert on the target domain being framed (Robins & Mayer,
2000). Also, with social and political issues, participants tend to bring in many of their
own views and beliefs that are not necessarily malleable, and certain individual
differences influence the strength of the metaphorical framing effect. For instance,
Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found that, with respect to politics of the USA, selfidentified Republicans were more resistant to metaphorical framing than Democrats and
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Independents. Arguably, the episodic memory task used here is less influenced by such
social factors. Lastly, with metaphorical framing, it is not always clear what type of
reasoning is congruent with what type of metaphor. For instance, two different metaphors
could lead to similar inferences. With CRIME IS A VIRUS/BEAST frames, “locking up”
criminals is argued to be congruent with the BEAST frame as it emphasizes punishment
(Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). However, viral outbreaks often involve quarantining
infected individuals to protect the rest of the public, such as has been seen with the
coronavirus currently. Therefore, “locking up” criminals could be considered an
inference following from the CRIME IS A VIRUS frame. Again, such interpretive factors
are not an issue in the episodic memory tests employed here. This is not to say that
metaphorical framing research lacks value; however, for the purpose of testing CMT
itself, episodic memory tests have certain advantages.
The last stream of research that most directly assesses CMT is online comprehension,
which has generated mixed findings. Though online comprehension is a logical variable
to explore, it may not be the only area in which conceptual metaphors influence
cognition. In fact, Bundgaard (2019) has recently proposed that cross-domain mappings
are psychologically real, but that their activation is not required to comprehend
conventional metaphor expressions. Conceptual metaphors may not be strictly required
for comprehension, but they may serve as useful schemas that help to interpret, organize
and encode metaphorical language, especially when the same cross-domain mapping is
extended over several different expressions. If this is the case, this may be why effects
supportive of CMT are found more consistently in offline studies (Nayak & Gibbs, 1990;
Katz & Law, 2010; Katz & Taylor, 2008, and studies reported here) than in online
studies.
One other possible advantage of the current study over the previous comprehension
studies is that it employed sentences that were putatively unrelated. In contrast, the
comprehension studies mentioned earlier used narratives in which the sentences all
logically connect. The issue here is that the narrative itself may influence online
comprehension. For instance, Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) point out that comprehension
times may be affected by the relation of the critical sentence to the meaning of the
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preceding narrative, and not only by the conceptual metaphor. This is not an issue in the
current study as the sentences were unrelated on the surface.

6.3

Implications for Deliberate Metaphor Theory

The findings from this set of experiments do not support Deliberate Metaphor Theory.
According to this theory, cross-domain mappings that would lead to the false memory
effects found in these experiments are proposed to depend on conscious awareness of
metaphoricity. When a metaphor is deliberate, that is, the speaker is intentionally using
the metaphor as a metaphor, the deliberateness is thought to afford conscious
metaphorical cognition. In contrast, non-deliberate metaphors do not afford conscious
metaphorical cognition, and therefore, do not activate cross-domain mappings.
It should be noted that these experiments did not manipulate deliberateness, unlike
Gibbs’s (2015) test of DMT in which deliberateness was manipulated via “pragmatic
markers” (words such as “like” that putatively signal a metaphorical comparison). Gibbs
found no evidence that the pragmatic markers influenced metaphor interpretation.
However, he only examined a single metaphorical utterance (“We really have come a
long way since the wedding”) and asked participants about the meaning of the utterance,
which may have in itself drawn deliberate attention to its metaphoricity. I am not arguing
that the concept of metaphor deliberateness be discounted as playing any role on
metaphor studies, especially in communicative contexts. It is possible that deliberateness
enhances conceptual metaphor activation, above activation occurring unconsciously, and
could possibly elicit stronger effects on memory.17 That possibility aside, Deliberate

17

In fact, one could test the effect of deliberateness on conceptual metaphor activation using the
current paradigm. For instance, study lists consisting of deliberate metaphor expressions could be
compared to study lists consisting of non-deliberate metaphor expressions. If the deliberate study
lists induce a greater proportion of false recognition for the critical consistent lures, it would
suggest that deliberateness enhances conceptual metaphor activation. Similar between list
comparisons have been conducted in other DRM research, such as lists based on associates vs.
categories (Buchanan, Brown, Cabeza, & Maitson, 1999; Knott & Dewhurst, 2007), situation lists
vs. DRM lists (Cann, McRae, & Katz, 2011, Experiment 2), and lists varying on gist-strength
(Cann, McRae, & Katz, 2011, Experiment 4).
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Metaphor Theory explicitly states that deliberateness affords conscious metaphorical
cognition, and it is consciousness that is the critical factor for a cross-domain mapping to
be engaged. The current data strongly refutes this claim.

6.4

Conclusion

This set of studies employed a novel technique to test the tenets of CMT and found strong
evidence that conceptual metaphors are psychologically real and influence cognition
automatically. By using the DRM paradigm, I have tested assumptions of CMT in terms
of a well-established, robust memory task familiar to cognitive psychologists. Across all
the studies, it was found that studying a list of expressions all based on the same
conceptual metaphor led to false recognitions of other expressions that were also based
on the same conceptual metaphor. These expressions were falsely recognized more often
than control expressions that also shared semantic overlap with the study list, but were
not based on the same metaphor. Also, converging evidence from self-reported strategies
(Chapter 3) and divided attention manipulations (Chapters 4 and 5) indicated that the
conceptual metaphors were engaged automatically, as participants rarely reported
consciously attending to the conceptual metaphors and still showed the effect even when
their attention was divided at either encoding or retrieval (or both). As such, this set of
studies supports the original conception of CMT proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980)
and Lakoff (1993). These studies also emphasize the utility of episodic memory tasks for
exploring tenets of CMT, and future research could employ other episodic tasks to
explore the boundary conditions under which conceptual metaphors organize and
influence memory.
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Appendix B: Study lists and lures
IDEAS ARE FOOD study list
What he said left a bad taste in my mouth.
That plan is on the back burner for now.
All this paper has are raw facts.
Learning is eating.
Those are warmed-over arguments.
We have to regurgitate everything we learned on the final.
Here’s a concept you can sink your teeth into.
The plan is half-baked.
This is the meaty part of the paper.
He devoured the book.
Her curiosity is insatiable.
I’ll give you some readings to chew on.
Knowledge is consumable.
She cooked up a new scheme.
We don’t spoon-feed our students.
Recognition test lures
(Critical CM)
-Ideas are food.
(Critical consistent)
-That claim is hard to swallow.
-He has an appetite for learning.
-There are too many facts to digest. (Final test only)
(Control metaphor)
-That kind of thinking is out of style.
-His first lecture just planted the seeds.
-She never arrives at the right conclusion. (Final test only)
(Control literal)
-We discussed the plan over dinner.
-The dessert was too sweet.
-This dish is best served cold. (Final test only)
-I came up with this scheme during lunch. (Final test only)
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LOVE IS A JOURNEY study list
They’re at a crossroads in their relationship.
This marriage is on the rocks.
We’ve come a long way as a couple.
Dating is a starting point.
It seems we’re just going in circles as a couple.
They’re in a dead-end relationship.
We’ve had some bumps in the road.
Relationships are vehicles.
My girlfriend and I may have to go our separate ways.
Where are we in this relationship?
Marriage is a landmark.
My fiancé and I can’t turn back now.
Break-ups are obstacles.
Their marriage has gone off the track.
I want to take things slow in this relationship.
Recognition test lures
(Critical CM)
-Love is a journey.
(Critical consistent)
-Their romance just took a turn for the worst.
-They didn’t take the path most couples take.
-My boyfriend and I are stuck in a rut. (Final test only)
(Control metaphor)
-Their relationship has lost its magic.
-She’s crazy about him.
-She swept him off his feet. (Final test only)
(Control literal)
-I took my girlfriend on a nice drive.
-We took a short-cut to our destination.
-You can only get to this place on foot. (Final test only)
-This pathway is a short walk. (Final test only)
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THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS study list
Your argument had a nice structure.
Our method will stand or fall on the strength of that claim.
His assumptions are built on sand.
Scientists are architects.
What will the form of the argument be?
They demolished his reasoning.
Without data our model will fall apart.
Evidence is support.
The argument collapsed.
That’s a shaky assumption.
Research is construction.
We need to buttress our paper with solid facts.
Facts are foundation.
She tore down his argument brick by brick.
Here are some more data to prop up the hypothesis.
Recognition test lures
(Critical CM)
-Theories are buildings.
(Critical consistent)
-That claim doesn’t hold much weight.
-Her work was a pillar in the discipline.
-We have put together only the framework of this hypothesis. (Final test only)
(Control metaphor)
-His argument fell apart at the seams.
-That paper gave birth to new lines of research.
-Her proposition never bore any fruit. (Final test only)
(Control literal)
-His house was well constructed.
-His apartment had an interesting layout.
-The centre has multiple levels. (Final test only)
-Her condo has three rooms. (Final test only)
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TIME IS MONEY study list
How did you spend the summer break?
I have some days off banked from last month.
Budget your hours.
Weekends are precious.
I don’t have the hours for this.
I’ll give you a minute.
Is that worth your while?
Years are invested.
Put aside a few days for this.
Can you spare an afternoon?
Hours are wasted.
How many minutes do I have left?
Free hours are valuable.
The diversion should buy him a few minutes.
This will save me many hours.
TIME IS MONEY recognition test lures
(Critical CM)
-Time is money
(Critical consistent)
-Lend me a few minutes.
-That cost me a day.
-You don’t use your hours profitably. (Final test only)
(Control metaphor)
-The weekend seems so far away.
-The years have not been kind to him.
-The deadline is approaching. (Final test only)
(Control literal)
-How much is your rent per month?
-He makes biweekly payments.
-She took out a low-interest loan. (Final test only)
-I will pay you back in a week. (Final test only)
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UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING study list
Here’s another way you can look at this problem.
Before you respond, let me first point something out.
That was an insightful dialogue.
The truth is clear.
Her thoughts on the subject are muddy.
With this issue, you have to look at the whole picture.
That was a brilliant remark.
Explaining is illuminating.
It was a murky discussion.
Could you elucidate your remarks?
Falseness is darkness.
It’s a transparent argument.
Ignorance is blindness.
The discussion was opaque.
He has tunnel-vision when it comes to this issue.
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING recognition test lures
(Critical CM)
-Understanding is seeing.
(Critical consistent)
-We have different views on this subject.
-That lecture opened my eyes.
-Let me enlighten you on this topic. (Final test only)
(Control metaphor)
-I couldn’t grasp his argument.
-That lesson was in one ear and out the other.
-It took a while, but the concept finally clicked. (Final test only)
(Control literal)
-Her vision is blurry.
-The lack of lighting caused low visibility.
-I have a nice view from my office. (Final test only)
-I think I can spot my house from here. (Final test only)
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Appendix C: Remember, know, and guess instructions. Adjusted from Gardiner,
Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1998).
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY.
Recognition memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness. Quite often
recognition brings back to mind something you recollect about what it is that you
recognise, as when, for example, you recognize someone’s face, and perhaps remember
talking to this person at a party the previous night. At other times recognition brings
nothing back to mind about what it is you recognise, as when, for example, you are
conﬁdent that you recognise someone, and you know you recognise them, because of
strong feelings of familiarity, but you have no recollection of seeing this person before.
You do not remember anything about them.
The same kinds of awareness are associated with recognising the sentences on the study
lists. Sometimes when you recognize a sentence as one you saw on the study list,
recognition will bring back to mind something you remember thinking about when the
sentence appeared then. You recollect something you consciously experienced at that
time. But sometimes recognizing a sentence as one you saw on the study list will not
bring back to mind anything you remember about seeing it then. Instead, the sentence
will seem familiar, so that you feel conﬁdent it was one you saw from the study list, even
though you don’t recollect anything you experienced when you saw it then.
For each sentence that you recognize, after you have pressed “O” (for OLD), please then
press “R” (for REMEMBER), if recognition is accompanied by some recollective
experience, or “K” (for KNOW), if recognition is accompanied by strong feelings of
familiarity in the absence of any recollective experience.
There will also be times when you do not remember the sentence, nor does it seem
familiar, but you might want to guess that it was one of the sentences you saw on the
study list. Feel free to do this, but if your OLD response is really just a guess, please
press “G” (for GUESS).
If you have any questions regarding these judgments, please ask the experimenter. If you
need to be reminded of what these judgments mean during the experiment, please refer to
the sheet on the desk that has these instructions printed out. Thank you.
Please press the REMEMBER key to continue.
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Appendix D: Strategy instructions for the study presented in Chapter 3.
Could you please take a minute to describe any strategies you used to remember this list?
If you used a strategy, please provide as much information about your strategy as you
can. Really, there are no right or wrong answers; we are just trying to get insight into how
people try to remember sentences. If you did not use any particular strategy, just type in:
“I just tried to remember the sentences without using any conscious strategy.”
Here are some possible strategies you might have used:
- repeating the sentences over and over mentally (if so, please estimate whether you
repeated the sentences very frequently, frequently, very infrequently),
- looking for a theme in the sentences presented that you thought might help you
remember the sentences (if so, please indicate the theme),
- trying to connect the sentences to a mental image or sound pattern (if so, please tell us
as much about the image or sound pattern as possible),
- trying to focus on specific words that you thought were very memorable (if so, please
indicate these words),
- some other strategy. If so, please briefly describe what it might be.
Please type your response below.
When you are finished typing your answer, press ESC to continue.
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Appendix E: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for initial recognition tests
of Chapter 3. Data displayed by condition (strategy vs. no strategy) and lure type.
Condition
Strategy

Lure type
Old
Crit CM
.08(.28)
Crit consistent
.05(.16)
Control metaphor
.03(.11)
Control literal
.04(.14)
Total¹
.05(.11)
No strategy
Crit CM
.05(.23)
Crit consistent
.08(.19)
Control metaphor
.14(.25)
Control literal
.00(.00)
Total¹
.07(.10)
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types.

R
.03(.16)
.01(.08)
.00(.00)
.01(.08)
.01(.05)
.03(.16)
.04(.14)
.04(.14)
.00(.00)
.03(.07)

K
.00(.00)
.01(.08)
.01(.08)
.00(.00)
.01(.03)
.03(.16)
.00(.00)
.04(.14)
.00(.00)
.02(.05)

G
.05(.23)
.03(.11)
.01(.08)
.03(.11)
.03(.09)
.00(.00)
.04(.14)
.05(.16)
.00(.00)
.02(.05)
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Appendix F: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for final recognition test of
Chapter 3. Data displayed by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), condition
(strategy vs. no strategy) and lure type.
Previously Condition
tested
Yes
Strategy

Lure type

Old

Crit CM
.19(.40)
Crit consistent
.21(.30)
Control metaphor .21(.32)
Control literal
.14(.31)
Total¹
.19(.26)
No strategy Crit CM
.14(.35)
Crit consistent
.26(.33)
Control metaphor .23(.32)
Control literal
.14(.25)
Total¹
.19(.21)
No
Strategy
Crit consistent
.03(.17)
Control metaphor .06(.23)
Control literal
.01(.08)
Total¹
.03(.11)
No strategy Crit consistent
.08(.28)
Control metaphor .11(.31)
Control literal
.03(.11)
Total¹
.07(.13)
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types.

R

K

G

.11(.32)
.11(.21)
.08(.22)
.04(.18)
.09(.19)
.03(.16)
.07(.17)
.04(.18)
.03(.11)
.04(.09)
.03(.17)
.03(.17)
.01(.08)
.02(.10)
.00(.00)
.05(.23)
.00(.00)
.02(.08)

.03(.17)
.04(.18)
.08(.22)
.03(.12)
.05(.12)
.05(.23)
.09(.23)
.08(.19)
.04(.14)
.07(.11)
.00(.00)
.00(.00)
.00(.00)
.00(.00)
.03(.16)
.00(.00)
.01(.08)
.01(.06)

.06(.23)
.06(.16)
.04(.14)
.07(.21)
.06(.10)
.05(.23)
.09(.23)
.11(.24)
.07(.17)
.08(.11)
.00(.00)
.03(.17)
.00(.00)
.01(.06)
.05(.23)
.05(.23)
.01(.08)
.04(.11)
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Appendix G: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for initial recognition tests
of Chapter 4. Data displayed by condition (full vs. divided attention) and lure type.
Condition
Full attention

Lure type
Old
Crit CM
.04(.20)
Crit consistent
.07(.20)
Control metaphor
.05(.15)
Control literal
.05(.15)
Total¹
.05(.09)
Divided attention
Crit CM
.20(.40)
Crit consistent
.30(.34)
Control metaphor
.31(.33)
Control literal
.24(.29)
Total¹
.26(.17)
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types.

R
.02(.14)
.01(.07)
.01(.07)
.02(.10)
.02(.05)
.08(.27)
.13(.24)
.11(.23)
.06(.16)
.10(.14)

K
.02(.14)
.01(.07)
.01(.07)
.01(.07)
.01(.05)
.02(.14)
.06(.16)
.06(.19)
.08(.19)
.06(.09)

G
.00(.00)
.05(.18)
.03(.12)
.02(.10)
.03(.07)
.10(.30)
.11(.21)
.14(.25)
.10(.20)
.11(.13)
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Appendix H: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for final recognition test of
Chapter 4. Data displayed by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), condition
(full vs. divided attention) and lure type.
Previously Condition
tested
Yes
Full
attention

Lure type

Old

Crit CM
.12(.33)
Crit consistent
.26(.34)
Control metaphor
.21(.32)
Control literal
.22(.32)
Total¹
.20(.22)
Divided
Crit CM
.36(.48)
attention
Crit consistent
.35(.37)
Control metaphor
.48(.38)
Control literal
.40(.40)
Total¹
.40(.25)
No
Full
Crit consistent
.04(.20)
attention
Control metaphor
.12(.33)
Control literal
.02(.10)
Total¹
.06(.13)
Divided
Crit consistent
.12(.33)
attention
Control metaphor
.26(.44)
Control literal
.16(.28)
Total¹
.18(.24)
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types.

R

K

G

.06(.24)
.08(.21)
.05(.18)
.13(.24)
.08(.11)
.14(.35)
.17(.28)
.20(.29)
.25(.35)
.19(.19)
.00(.00)
.02(.14)
.00(.00)
.01(.05)
.04(.20)
.04(.20)
.05(.15)
.04(.12)

.04(.20)
.08(.21)
.07(.18)
.03(.12)
.06(.09)
.10(.30)
.05(.15)
.12(.28)
.07(.18)
.09(.15)
.04(.20)
.02(.14)
.01(.07)
.02(.08)
.02(.14)
.06(.24)
.02(.10)
.03(.11)

.02(.14)
.10(.25)
.09(.22)
.06(.16)
.07(.12)
.12(.33)
.13(.26)
.16(.31)
.08(.21)
.12(.15)
.00(.00)
.08(.27)
.01(.07)
.03(.10)
.06(.24)
.16(.37)
.09(.22)
.10(.18)
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Appendix I: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for initial recognition tests
of Chapter 5. Data displayed by attention at study (full vs. divided), attention at test
(full vs. divided) and lure type.
Attention
at Study
Full

Attention
at test
Full

Lure type

Old

Crit CM
.18(.39)
Crit consistent
.18(.27)
Control metaphor
.09(.19)
Control literal
.06(.20)
Total¹
.13(.18)
Divided
Crit CM
.08(.27)
Crit consistent
.15(.26)
Control metaphor
.10(.20)
Control literal
.08(.21)
Total¹
.10(.16)
Divided
Full
Crit CM
.15(.37)
Crit consistent
.32(.35)
Control metaphor
.32(.39)
Control literal
.17(.26)
Total¹
.24(.20)
Divided
Crit CM
.25(.44)
Crit consistent
.33(.33)
Control metaphor
.35(.36)
Control literal
.24(.34)
Total¹
.29(.25)
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types.

R

K

G

.00(.00)
.03(.11)
.03(.11)
.01(.08)
.02(.04)
.05(.22)
.08(.21)
.06(.17)
.05(.19)
.06(.14)
.00(.00)
.03(.11)
.01(.08)
.03(.11)
.02(.05)
.03(.16)
.05(.15)
.05(.15)
.03(.11)
.04(.08)

.08(.27)
.03(.11)
.04(.13)
.03(.11)
.04(.12)
.03(.16)
.01(.08)
.04(.13)
.00(.00)
.02(.05)
.08(.27)
.13(.25)
.10(.20)
.05(.15)
.09(.12)
.05(.22)
.13(.22)
.16(.29)
.09(.19)
.11(.14)

.10(.31)
.13(.25)
.03(.11)
.03(.11)
.07(.11)
.00(.00)
.06(.17)
.00(.00)
.03(.11)
.02(.05)
.08(.27)
.17(.29)
.21(.30)
.09(.19)
.13(.12)
.18(.38)
.15(.26)
.14(.25)
.13(.22)
.15(.14)
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Appendix J: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for final recognition test of
Chapter 5. Data displayed by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), attention at
study (full vs. divided), attention at test (full vs. divided) and lure type.
Previously Attention
tested
at Study
Yes
Full

Attention
at test
Full

Lure type

Crit CM
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Total¹
Divided
Crit CM
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Total¹
Divided
Full
Crit CM
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Total¹
Divided
Crit CM
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Total¹
No
Full
Full
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Total¹
Divided
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Total¹
Divided
Full
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Total¹
Divided
Crit consistent
Control metaphor
Control literal
Total¹
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types.

Old

R

K

G

.49(.51)
.38(.42)
.33(.42)
.36(.40)
.39(.33)
.38(.49)
.35(.38)
.36(.36)
.25(.36)
.33(.27)
.54(.51)
.58(.34)
.50(.38)
.33(.37)
.49(.27)
.53(.51)
.45(.39)
.46(.43)
.45(.39)
.47(.31)
.05(.22)
.10(.31)
.08(.22)
.08(.20)
.20(.41)
.08(.27)
.10(.26)
.13(.19)
.15(.37)
.28(.46)
.13(.30)
.19(.26)
.25(.44)
.30(.46)
.19(.33)
.25(.31)

.15(.37)
.14(.28)
.13(.27)
.12(.24)
.13(.24)
.15(.36)
.11(.27)
.14(.28)
.09(.25)
.12(.20)
.18(.39)
.14(.26)
.09(.19)
.08(.18)
.12(.20)
.15(.36)
.16(.29)
.15(.28)
.11(.29)
.14(.19)
.03(.16)
.03(.16)
.03(.11)
.03(.11)
.08(.27)
.03(.16)
.03(.11)
.04(.12)
.03(.16)
.03(.16)
.01(.08)
.02(.08)
.08(.27)
.05(.22)
.08(.24)
.07(.20)

.13(.34)
.14(.30)
.13(.25)
.09(.19)
.12(.17)
.03(.16)
.09(.22)
.10(.20)
.09(.22)
.08(.14)
.10(.31)
.13(.27)
.19(.32)
.09(.19)
.13(.14)
.03(.16)
.10(.23)
.14(.28)
.14(.28)
.10(.13)
.00(.00)
.00(.00)
.00(.00)
.00(.00)
.00(.00)
.00(.00)
.01(.08)
.00(.03)
.05(.22)
.05(.22)
.01(.08)
.04(.10)
.08(.27)
.10(.30)
.03(.11)
.07(.17)

.21(.41)
.10(.20)
.08(.18)
.15(.28)
.13(.15)
.20(.41)
.15(.28)
.13(.25)
.08(.21)
.14(.16)
.26(.44)
.31(.32)
.22(.30)
.17(.26)
.24(.22)
.35(.48)
.19(.27)
.18(.31)
.20(.35)
.23(.23)
.03(.16)
.08(.27)
.05(.15)
.05(.13)
.13(.33)
.05(.22)
.06(.20)
.08(.15)
.08(.27)
.21(.41)
.10(.26)
.13(.23)
.10(.30)
.15(.36)
.09(.19)
.11(.22)
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Appendix K: High-threshold correction procedure
To apply the “high-threshold correction,” the false recognition proportion when the lure
is unrelated to the study list is subtracted from the false recognition proportion when it is
related (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Schacter et al., 1996; Seamon et al., 1998). In Chapter
5, the unrelated critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the
unrelated control literal lures for both the initial recognition tests (.244 vs. .136) and for
the repeated lures on the final recognition test (.440 vs. .348). However, there were no
reliable interactions between lure type and attention at either study or test, so the overall
unrelated false recognition proportions averaged across all conditions were used as the
subtraction values. These values were subtracted from the main false recognition
proportions (i.e., when these lures were related to the study list) for each participant. For
example, on the initial recognition tests, one participant had a false recognition
proportion of .5 for the critical consistent lures and .25 for the control literal lures when
these lures were related to the study lists. After the adjustment was applied, the
proportions would be .256 and .114 respectively. The mean adjusted values for the initial
recognition tests are displayed in Table K-1 and for the final recognition test are
displayed in Table K-2.
Table K-1. Comparison of adjusted false recognition proportions for critical consistent
lures and control literal lures. Data are from the initial recognition tests in Chapter 5.
Unadjusted proportions, the adjustment calculation, and the final adjusted values are
presented.
Attention Attention Lure type
Unadjusted
Adjustment
Adjusted
at study
at test
false
false
recognition
recognition¹
Full
Full
Crit consistent
.29(.24)
– .244
.05(.24)
Cont literal
.18(.20)
– .136
.05(.20)
Divided
Crit consistent
.33(.23)
– .244
.09(.23)
Cont literal
.16(.19)
– .136
.03(.19)
Divided
Full
Crit consistent
.54(.22)
– .244
.29(.22)
Cont literal
.36(.26)
– .136
.22(.26)
Divided
Crit consistent
.52(.26)
– .244
.27(.26)
Cont literal
.36(.24)
– .136
.23(.24)
¹Some discrepancies due to rounding.
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Table K-2. Comparison of adjusted false recognition proportions for repeated critical
consistent lures and repeated control literal lures. Data are from the final recognition test
in Chapter 5. Unadjusted proportions, the adjustment calculation, and the final adjusted
values are presented.
Attention Attention Lure type
Unadjusted
Adjustment
Adjusted
at study
at test
(Repeated)
false
false
recognition
recognition¹
Full
Full
Crit consistent
.61(.28)
– .440
.17(.28)
Cont literal
.36(.31)
– .348
.01(.31)
Divided
Crit consistent
.60(.25)
– .440
.16(.25)
Cont literal
.29(.26)
– .348
-.05(.26)
Divided
Full
Crit consistent
.73(.20)
– .440
.29(.20)
Cont literal
.47(.23)
– .348
.13(.23)
Divided
Crit consistent
.69(.23)
– .440
.25(.23)
Cont literal
.50(.27)
– .348
.15(.27)
¹Some discrepancies due to rounding.
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